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PREFACE

The delegates to the 1971-1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention will need historical, legal and comparative
information about the Montana Constitution. Recognizing
this need, the 1971 Legislative Assembly created the
Constitutional Convention Commission and directed it to
assemble and prepare essential information for the Convention.
To fulfill this responsibility, the Constitutional Convention Commission is preparing a series of research
reports under the general title of Constitutional Convention Studies. In addition the series of research reports
the Commission has authorized the reprinting of certain
documents for the use of Convention delegates.
This research memorandum, a ·collection of readings on the
organization of constitutional conventions was prepared
under the supervision of the Commission's Convention
Arrangements Committee consisting of William Sternhagen,
Chairman; Clyde Hawks; Leonard Schulz: and Charles Bovey.
The selection of readings is designed to provide a background for the delegates on the organization of recent
constitutional conventions. Although all items selected
are published in other sources, the Commission felt that
the collection of these essays into a single volume would
be especially useful to the delegates. The Conunission's
appreciation is extended to the various authors and publishers who so graciously granted permission to use the
selections contained herein.
This report is respectfully submitted to the people of
Montana and their delegates to the 1971-1972 Constitutional Convention.
ALEXANDER BLEWETT
CHAIRMAN

iii

The major questions in catting and assembling
the convention are tegat questions. In cont~ast.
the problem of successfully organiaing the
convention so that its ~ork may be done in an
effective and e:,:peditious manner is primarily
a practical one.

Carrol L. Wagner, Jr.
Vir inia Law Review
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CHAPTER I
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

By Carrol L. Wagner, Jr.

Reprinted by permission of author and publisher from:
Carrol
L. Wagner, Jr. "State Constitutional Change:
the Constitutional Convention." Virginia Law Review 54 {1968); pp. 9951030.
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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL a-IANGE:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
[E]acb generation ... [has] a right to choose for itself the form of g<Xlnmne•t it believes most promotive of its own happiness.

Thomas Jefferson'
Constirutionalism has been defined as
the ... proposition that the government is a set of activities organized
by and operated on behalf of the people, but subject to a series of restraints which attempt to insure that the power which goes with such
governance is not abused by those who are called upon to do the
governing. 2
In conjunction with Jefferson's commendation of strucrural change in
government to maximize public happiness, this proposition is likely to command universal assent in the United States.3 A written constirution is generally regarded as a fundamental law performing certain fundamental functions: defining the structure of government over a long period of time, restraining governmental powers, protecting individual rights, and symbolizing the social consensus or the basic unity of the body politic. Through
these functions a constitution creates confidence among the various segments
l Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, in 7 WRITINGS
13 (Ford ed.).
2 C. FRIEDRICH, CoNSTITlJTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCMCY 33 (1941).
a The right of the people to determine the manner in which they arc to be governed
has been widely expressed in American political theory. As early as 1690, John Locke in
England articulated a political philosophy which recognized the inherent right of every
peoPle " ... to resume their original liberty, and by the establishment of a new legislature
(such as they shall think fit), provide for their own safety and security, which is the
end for which they are in society." J. loc:KE, Two Treatises of Government in GRUT
PoLmCAL THINKERS 409 (\V. Ebenstein ed., 3d ed. 1963). Thomas Jefferson drew
upon Locke's theories in drafting the Declaration of Independence. The compact
theory of the state, the concept of natural law and rights, the doctrine of PoPular
sovereignty, and the notion of a right of revolution, all theories identified with John
Locke, were the philosophical basis of the document adopted on July 4, 1776. George
Mason anticipated Jefferson's ideas in drafting the Virginia Bill of Rights of June 12,
1776. This famous document recognized that: " ..• when any government shall be
found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an
indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it. in such
manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal." The Virginia Bill of
Rights in DocuMENTs oF AMERJCAM HISTORY 103 (H. Commagcr ed., 7th ed. 1962).

-3-

of society chat governmental decisions and actions will be circumscribed. by
procedural and suhst:mtive safeguards.•
Borh the Federal Constitution and state constitutions perform these general functions. However, this general similarity does not dictate a uniform
mode of analysis for both national and state constitutions. There is a real
difference in functional emphasis, as Professor Frank Grad suggests in
another article in this Symposium; 5 state constitutions are primarily concerned with restraining governmental powers while the Federal Constitution is devoted in large part to symbolic and protective functions.
There are two related reasons for this difference in functional emphasis.
In the first place, state constitutions now play a relatively minor role in preserving the rights of cicizens.G Most of these rights, whether because of the
states' failure to fulfill this responsibility or otherwise, arc already protected
by the Federal Constitution against encroachment by the states as well as
the Federal Governmenc. 1 State constitutions are now primarily concerned
• For a wide-ranging discussion of the theoretical nature of constitutionalism as
seen by a political theorist, see C. FRIEDRICH, CoNSTITUTIO!'IAL GovERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY (rev. ed. 1950). Friedrich remarks:
Rights are constitutional, not natural. The constitution, . . . which i5 the
process by which governmental action is effectively restrained, functions also
as the most effective symbol of unifying forces operative in a · community. Our
insight into social motivation owing to modern research enables u~ to distinguish
fairly well between the system of institutional safegu:irds, patterned in many
different ways but always designed to prevent the concentration of power, and the
congeries of symbols expressive of communal traditions and general agreements.
Through recognizing this, we should avoid the cynicism which springs from a
naive rational search for close correspondence between symbols and the things
they refer to. It is equally important to recognize the need for continual change.
An appreciation of the symbolic value of the constitution need not obscure the
dynamic, changing nature of the traditions and agreements which it symuolizes.
Id. at 172.
5 Grad, The State Co111titution: Its Function and Fonn for Our Time, 54 VA. L.
Iu:v. 928 (1968).
6 In 1873 the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment left responsibility for protecting civil
rights from state action to the state: constitutions. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873). However, later cases utilized the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to require that states avoid abridging those rights protected
by the Federal Constitution, infra nore 7, thereby raking the protection of these rights
from the exclusive domain of state constitutions.
7 The United States Supreme Court has construed the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit the states from abridging certain rights embodied in the first eigh1 amendments

co the United Stttts Constinnion. The federal righta which the fourrcenrh Amendrnenc
presently guarantees arc, from rhe First Amendment, rhc establishment clause, Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947), freedom of religion, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940), freedom of speech and press, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925),
and the right of assembly, Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); from the Fourth
Amendment, the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio, 367
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instead with organic matters-with structuring the interrelationship between
coordinate branches of state government and with defining the powers of
state government vis a vis units of local government. In the second place, the
Federal Government is one of delegated powers. Its powers and those of its
separate branches must emanate from a specific grant; no power is implied
which is not necessary to fulfill a clearly expressed constitutional duty.
State governments, on the other hand, are assumed to possess plenary power
in those areas not within the federal sphere. 8 The difficulty in construing a
state constitution is not, as it is under the Federal Constitution, one of dis- ·
covering a grmt of authority so much as it is one of finding a constitutional
denial of authority. Explicit limitations on governmental powers must
therefore be included in a state constitution, and in formulating these necessarily detailed limitations the document inevitably performs a function
which in the federal system is accomplished through legislation-a function
which may be appropriately termed "super-legislative."
This difference in functional emphasis has important ramifications for
the processes of state constitution-making. The withdrawal of certain
areas from lcgislath·e discretion usually demands the inclusion of a considerable amount of dw1il in the constitution in order to make the denials of
power explicit. J\luch of this detail will be keyed to the state and local
governmental structures and entities existing at the time the document is
fashioned, and will embody many value choices which are much less permanent than those values embedded in the Federal Constitution. Periodic
alteration is thus a necessity if the complicated organic structure is not to
degenerate into a compil:ition of archaic technicalities. This means that state
U.S. 643 (1961}; from the Fifth Amendment, the right to jus~ compensation, Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), and the privilege against self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); from the Sixth Amendment, the right to
assistance of counsel, Gideon ,•. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the right to confront wit11esses, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the right to a speedy trial,
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), and the right to have compulsory
process served upon witnesses, \Vashington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); from the
Eighth Amendment, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); and from the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights, a
right to privacy, Griswold v. Connccticu't, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
II Dodd, The FU11ction of a State Comtitution, 30 POl.. Sc,. Q. 201-12 (1915). Professor Cooley said of state constitution legislative provisions :
In creating a legislative dep:ur:ment and conferring upon it the lcgisl:uivc power,
the people must be understood to have conferred the full and complete power as
it rests in, and may be exercised by, the sovereign power of any country, subject
only to such restrictions as they may have seen fit to impose, and to the lunitations which arc contained in the Constitution of the United States. The legislative
depamnent is not made a special agency for the exercise of specifically defined
legislative powers, but is intrusted with the general authority to make laws at
discretion.
T. Coou.Y, I CossntL"TJONAL LtMITAnoss 175 (8th ed. 1927).
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constitutions should be more susceptible to alteration than the Federal Constitution: details must be revamped whenever the specific situation which
prompted their inclusion has changed. But the fundamental law embedded
in the state constitution, the provisions protecting fundamental rights, should
be secure and relatively immune from change. The differing nature of fundamental and super-legislative provisions in a state constitution suggests that
they should be subject to different procedures for :ilteration.
MODES OF CoNSTl'fUTIONAL CHANGE

There exist tw~ orderly modes by which constitutions are changed:
interpretation of constitutional language and amendment or revision of the
document. "Interpretation" refers to changes in the application of existing
constitutional provisions, accomplished through a gloss on the words of the
document without changing the words themselves. This gloss is usually
provided by the judiciary, but may also result from legislative, executive or
private interpretation. "Amendment" and "revision" refer to a formal political procedure which results either in limited changes in the words of the
document ("amendment") or in a comprehensive, formal rewriting of a
substantial part of the document ("revision").

Interpretation
To the extent that written constitutional language states general principles
of law, interpretation of the language is necessary in deciding concrete cases.
The most common form of interpretation is that practiced hy the judiciary,
and is well illustrated by the United States Supreme Court decisions concerning the scope of the Bill of Rights of the F edcral Constitution.9 Interpretation is also practiced, less formally, by other branches of the government.
For example, "political questions" represent those areas of constitutional
law in which the courts expressly defer to the constitutional interpretations
of coordinate branches of the government. 10 The constitutionality of proposed legislation is a legitimate subject of debate in the legislative process.
And governmental practices approved by or unknown to the populace and
unchallenged in the courts may shape the application of constitutional provisions. In one sense, then, all governmental activity is a continuous process
of interpreting fundamental law.
In many cases interpretation is static and analogous to statutory construction: for example, inconsistent provisions are harmonized or a decision
is made as to which of a number of provisions control. On the other hand,
dynamic interpretation-interpretative constitutional change-can be sa id to
note 7 supra.
IOSee, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.

11 Sec

433 (1939).
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occur when new meaning is given to constitutional language: this may be
meaning which is required for the solution of problems uncontemplated by
the framers of the document. but which is consistent with their value judgments; or it may be meaning which sec~ contrary to the express or implied
intentions or presumptions of the framers; or it may be meaning which
inserts a new value into the constitution.
Several factors interact to determine whether judicial interpretation in
a given jurisdiction will be static or will manifest constitutional change..
First, the more general the language of the document. the more susceptible
it is to interpretation guaranteeing rights or permitting governmental activities uncontemplatcd by the framers, while the detailed delineation of rights
and powers and the inclusion of quasi-statutory material in the constitution is more conducive to statutory-like interpretation. 11 Second, insofar
as interpretative change depends upon action or acquiescence by the judidary, it also depends upon the attitudes of judicial personnel and the bench's
position in the state's legal and social order. The tradition of constitutional
jurisprudence, the position of community esteem occupied by the judiciary,
~md their dependence upon periodic reelection or reappointment all influence the bench's willingness to effect constitutional change. 12 Third, the
Careful srudy shows that the state constitutional change by interpretation and
informal· processes does occur but that state constitutions have not been broadly
susceptible to growth by political, judicial, and popular interpretation. The
many limitations placed upon' the instruments of state government, together with
the common pnctice of outlining governmental powers in detail, discourages substantfal constitutional growth and chan~e through interpretive mems.
Bartley, Methods of Constitutional Chll11ge, m STATE CoNSTTTUTIONAL R~\·1s10N 23-24
(W. Graves ed. 1960).
12 For example, the Supreme Coun of the United States occupies the highest judicial
position in the eyes of the public, and its members arc independent of rhe political
system. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Coun's interpretation of the Federal
Constitution is a paradigm of dynamic interpretation. The Cou·n has overruled itself
over one hundred rimes on constittnional interpretations. Tm CoNSTITUTION OF ~
UNtTD> STATES OP" AMERICA 1541-49 (Government Printing Office 1964). See Frankfurter,
fobn Marshall md the fudicial Frmction, 69 HARV. L. REv. 217, 229 (19H), where Mr.
Justice Frankfuner states:
No doubt, these provisions of the Constitution were not calculated to give
permanent legal sanction merely to the social arrangements and beliefs of a
particulat epoch. Lilce all legal provisions without a nxed technical mcming,
they arc ambulant, adaptable ro the changes of time. That is their suength ..••
Although we usually describe constitutional law as fundamental or organic law,
many state consritutions have provisions which are in no way fundamental or organic
1aw.
Such particubrs ha\·e been inserted in these documents for various reasons, but
most of them add up to a lack of confidence in the legislative organs of government. Since these constitutional provisions cannot readily be changed to harmonize with the ch~ngcs in society and culture, they become an incubus preventing the adoption of modern legislation and tying the living present to the
dead p2St. We must learn to distinguish w,hat is fundamental and lasting in value
11
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possibility of changing constitutional language directly through the political
processes may affect the judiciary's attitude toward dynamic constitutional
interpretation. The ease with which a change can be effected through political processes is dependent not only on formal requirements but also on
the nature of the document. The short Vermont constitution (4,840 words)
uses general language and has been amended only forty-five times in one
hundred eighty-three years; by contrast, the long and detailed Louisiana
constitution (236,000 words) has been amended four hundred sixty times in
only forty-five years.1 3 When a constitution is rather elaborate, and when
change through the political processes is not especially difficult, the judiciary
is most apt to avoid dynamic interpretation. State constitutional interpretation is generally static because political revision is so frequent. In a ten-year
period following World War 11, over fifteen hundred constitutional changes
were proposed in the fifty stat~s, and almost twelve hundred were adopted. 14

The Political Processes

)

The political processes of amendment and revision represent formal and
instantaneous modes of changing the actual wording of the constit~tion.
Consequently, both processes are clearly distinguishable from interpretative change, but it is difficult to draw a sharp line of distinction between the
two processes themselves. The most commonly verbalized distinction is an
ambiguous quantitative difference; 15 "amendments" are usually specific and
isolated changes, though not necessarily limited to alteration of a single
provision, while a "revision" usually involves changing a group of provisions and may entail a rewriting of the entire document. The essential
difference in the results which the words "amendment" and "revision"
from what is temporary and include only the fundamentals in our constitutional
documents, leaving other matters to be acted upon by properly constructed and
competent legislatures.
Walker, Myth and Reality in State Conrtitutional Devel<>f11nent, in STATE CoNS11TVTIONAL
REv1s10N 13 (W. Graves ed. 1960).
18 THE CouNCIL oF STATE GoVERNMENTS, THE BooK oF lliE STATES 1966-67, at 10 (1966)
(hereinafter cited as THE BooK OF STATES].
14 Graves, Use of the Amending Procedure Since World War II, in STATE CoNSTITUnoNAL REVIs10N 100, 102-03 (W. Graves ed. 1960).
16 (n A . STURM, METHODS OF STATF. CoNmnmoNAL REFORM 25 (1954), the distinction between "amendment" and "revision" is noted:
The former refers to a change of very specific nature and limited application,
although more than a single section of the constitution may be affected. "Revislon" is a term of much broader scape implying the rewriting of several sections OJ even the major part of a document thereby accomplishing comprehensive changes, perhaps of structure, power relationships, and basic policies. Any
attempt to classify all constitutional alterations either as "amendments" or "revisions" is doomed to failure. The terms are relative, and the one shades into
the other. Nonetheless, the designations are of common currency and provide
useful tools in describing the technique of constitutional reform.

l

\

describe is small: nothing more substantial than the circumstance that a
change affects a large or a small portion of the document. The terms do
not differ in procedural consequence except in those states where different
procedures :ire defined in the constitution, or v.:-herc the number of amendments which may be proposed by the legislature is limited. In most states
the methods by which "amendment" or "revision" may be effected are the
same, and this situation is preferable in that it facilitates the selection of a
method of change according to the qualitative nature of the change that.
is proposed, rather than by reference to an artificial terminological dichotomy between "amendment" and "revision."
The procedures for amendment prescribed in the fifty state constitutions
are not uniform. The method most often prescribed is that change be proposed by the legislature and ratified by a popular vote, some states requiring
approval by more than a m:ijority of those voting on the proposal. 18 Fourteen states provide for a "constitutional initiative" whereby proposed amendments may be placed on the ballot upon the petition of a certain number of
voters. 17 The legislatures of forty-six states arc authorized, either by con~titutional provision or judicial decision, to call a convention to make any
constitutional changes, 18 but this method is not often used for a single
amendment.
Revisi~n by its very nature usually entails a more protracted procedure
than amendment, although the same spectrum of methods may be available.
The legislature is often the vehicle for change. It may submit for ratification a sweeping series of amendments or an entirely new document. Absent
constitutional restrictions on the number and type of proposed amendments,
the weight of authority appears to be that legislatures have the power to
frame and submit a new cpnstitution. 19 \Vhere the legislature docs have this
power, lack of time and expertise may necessitate the appointment of a
commission to study the existing constitution and to propose changcs. 20
The primary alternative to legislative constitutional revision is the con~titutional convention. Thirty-eight state constitutions provide specifically
for such conventions, and in most of the other states it is established that
the legislature may authorize the convocation of a convention.21 The pro1tTm BooK of' STATES 11.
n Id. at 12.
1a Id. at 13.
19 SroRM, supra note IS at 22.
20 Such a commission may be the product of joint action by the legislative and
~xecutive branches, or of independent action by either branch. Su Rich, Revision
by Cummission, 4-0 NAT'L MuN. REV. 201-02 (1951).
!I Su, e.g., In re Opinion of the Governors, H R.I. S6, 178 A. 433 (1935); Tm Boos:
-OF SnTTs 13; \V. Dooo, THE REvtSJON AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CoNSTITUTIONS 44-45
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cedure for calling a convention and the extent of its power varies from
state to state. 22 The typical process is for the legislature to submit to the
electorate the question of whether a convention should be called. If the
vote is affirmative, the legislature thereafter enacts legislation providing for
the selection of delegates, the assembling and organization of the convention, and compensation of the delegates. The convention then meets and
discharges its obligation. Usually, but not always, the convention's product
must be submitted to the voters before it becomes effective.
The popular initiative offers another possible method of constitutional
revision. However, while there may be no legal impediment to revision by
initiative in those stares which authorize amendment by initiative, this method is usually limited as a practical matter ro specific amendments.
Evaluative Considerations
Several basic values should be considered in deciding which method of
constitutional change is appropriate in a given situation. The foremost value
is democracy; it is desirable to utilize a procedure which will reflect the
popular will as accurately as possible. Such a procedure, in addition to
implementing a fundamental American value, will best insure rati fication of
the final product.
A corollary of this democratic value is an educational value; the process
of change should be calculated to inform both the drafters and the citizenry
of all relevant substantive factors in order to insure a fully knowledgable
decision. If the change proposed is a complex one involving special knowledge-such as altering city boundaries or changing the judicial system-it
may require appoinnnent of an expert body. A proposal w hich involves
extensive change of the constitutional scheme or which may have a significant effect on the integrated nature of the document demands a more
deliberative method than does a relatively simple proposal..
(1910); H. WALKER, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 55 (1948); Dodd, State Conrtitutional
Comumtions 1111d State Legislative Power, 2 VAND. L. REv. 27, 29-30 (1948 ).
The preamble to the state constitution may provide the judiciary with grounds for
recognizing the inherent right to the citizens to convoke a convention. See, e.g., N.J.
CoNST. art. I, S 2, which provides:
·
Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the people, and
they have the right at all times to alter or reform the same, whenever the
public good may require it.
22 Jn Sn:RM, mpra note 15 at 85, the author categorizes the procedures for calling
a convention as follows:
(1) those (constitutions] which vest power in the legislative assembly to call
a convention without popular referendum, (2) those (constitutions) which
authorize the legislature to submit the convention ~uestion to the voters whenever it is considered necessary, (3) those (constitutions) which require periodic
submission of the question, and (4) those states which make no provision for
constitutional conventions.

-10-

A third important value is that of disinterested rationality, and the achievement of this value is especially contingent upon the character of the body
which participates in drafting the provision or document. The body should
be composed of Individuals who are As free a, possible from interest group
or partisan pressure, and who are themselves unbiased. II, for example, the
question is reapportionment of the legislature, the legislators may be in an
excellent position to judge the effects of a particular scheme. Nevertheless,
allowing the legisiators to draft the provision is objectionable because it
facilitates political maneuvering on a matter where self-interest may be
intense.
The final value is a purely practical one-the cost to society. · Some
processes, notably the convention, require far more time, effort and ·money
than the others. This value should not be a primary determinant unless
resources are limited. Ordinarily expense should be taken into account only
when consideration of other values has not resulted in selection of a clearly
desirable method.
I

,

Choosing the Method
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that there is no a pnon,
correct metnod of changing a constitution. The best method at any time is
determined by balancing the values outlined above in terms of the qualitative
nature of the particular ch:mge sought. In order to facilitate this balancing
of values, a state constitution should allow change by all of the established
methods: the popular initiative, the special or general commission, the
constitutional convention, and submission by the legislature. The availability
of a full range of methods will provide the flexibility necessary to prevent
the constitution's super-legislative provisions from becoming obsolete, while
at the same time safeguarding certain fundamental principles. Additional
refinements might be prescribed to accomplish these purposes; for example,
the vote needed to ratify a modification of fundamental personal rights
might be higher than that needed to approve an organic change. An extensive alteration of the d?cument might require ratification in two elect.ions
while a change in super-legislative provisions would require only one.
Or certain methods might be prohibited in situations where they are particularly susceptible to abuse-for example, the legislature might be prohihited from maldng proposals for amendments affecting its own powers
or composition.
\Vherc extensive changes are proposed for the typically complex current
state constitution, a deliberative method of change is required. Often a series
of isol:ited amendments will have produced redundancies, inconsistencie~
and problems in interpreting the original document, and the task of revision
will require a comprehensive study and reorganization. Moreover, many of
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the advocates of ch:mgc suggest alterations such as abolition of certai n elective offices, reallocations of power among the branches of the government,
or modification of the bicameral structure of the state lcgislature23 -alterations which affect the basic. core of a state's organic scheme. Usually the
method most likely to insure the deliberation necessary for these complex
and fundamental changes will be the constitutional convention.
In such a situation demanding constitutional revision of large proportions,
the constitutional convention is generally compatible with the evaluative
considerations mentioned above. Since the delegates to the convention will
be popularly elected from all parts of the state for the express purpose of
constitutional change, this method offers potentially high effectiveness in
accurately representing the popular will. The time and manpower involved
in a convention facilitate detailed and comprehensive consideration of major
problems and communication of relevant information to the public. The
use of special committees to draft technical provisions provides the expertise
needed in particular areas. If convention delegates are elected on a nonpartisan basis, the convention will probably be less susceptible to partisan
politics than a legislative commission. Although the convention is by far
the most expensive method of constitutional change, a successful convention
is obviously a worthwhile investment.
As demonstrated recently in New York, Kentucky, Rhode Island, and
J\laryland, a constitutional convention may waste large an1ounts of public
resources and energies if popular ratification is not secu red. Such failures
may suggest to some that the convention is no longer a viable method of
change, bur the failures are more probably the result of mistakes in the
operation of those conventions than of inherent defects in the convention
method itself. The remainder of the present Note will explore the preparation procedures, internal organization, and ratification process which are
most likely to produce a useful and successful convention, one which is
consistent with the evaluative considerations noted above.
PRECONVENTION PROCEDURES

During the Revolutionary and immediate post-revolutionary periods,
many state constitutions as well as the Federal Constitution itself were
drafted and adopted by ad hoc and irregular processes. 24 These constitutions might be termed revolutionary in character since they were not fonnulated according to an orderly procedure established by a pre-existing govII Se,

1nur.U1 MoonN1z1No STAT£ Gon:uiM&HT (CED 1967).

u In North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia and New Jersey an ad hoc
legislative body adopted a constitution in the same manner as it enacted statutes. R.
HoAR, CoNsnrunoNAL CONVENTIONS 1-10 (1917); SruRM, supra note 15 at S; Note,
The C011Jtitutional CoTl'tlention, Its Nature and Powers-And the Amending Procedure, 10 UTAH L. REv. 390 (1966).
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ernmenc. Their legality derived from the attainment of sovereignty by
victorious forces and from the absence of any independent authority to
pass on their validity.~ 5 They were commonly justified in terms of the
sovereign right of the people to ordain their own forms of govemmcnt.29
Except for the Qvil War era, which precipitated the irregular adoption
of many state constitutions,2 1 the judiciary in the United States has tended
to _insist that constitutional conventions occur in accordance with procedures derived directly or indirectly from the constitution already in exist-.
ence. 28 However, in several instances courts have refused to accept challenges to the methods used to promulgate new constitutions, usually on the
grounds that a "political question" was involved or that the p~blic had
acquiesced. 29 But like the Revolutionary and Civil War constitutions, the
charters involved in these decisions were products of a major political upheaval-that of the post-Reconstruction era. Consequently they are not
viable precedent for modern state constitutional revision. Absent comparable social disorder, proponents of revision are well advised to adhere
scrupulously to the legal procedural requirements stated in existing constitutions.
Calling a Constitutional C01Zvention

Thirty-nine states have constitutional provisions providing for the convocation of a constitutional convention.30 In seven other states, legislative
authority to call a convention has been established by a combination of
statutes, judicial decisions, and opinions of the attorney general.31 Thus
only four states~ 2 appear not to have an established procedure for calling a
convention. Of the states which authorize the convention method of revision, twenty constitutionally require a .two-thirds vote of the legislature
to initiate the call, one requires a three-fifths vote of its unicameral legislature, and the others require approval by a majority of the legislature.31
25 The distinction has been made between "revolutionary" conventions, such as those
mentioned here, and "constitutional" conventions c:zlled by the people through the
legislature and subject to an existing constitution. Sec Branon, PO'WerJ of CtmW11•
tiom, 7 VA. L. Rro. 79 (1901).
Z6£.g., Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. 20, 36-37 (]793) (opinion by Spencer Roane).
%1 See \Vhite, Amendment and Revision of State Constitutio111, 100 U. PA. L. R£v.

1132, 1133 n.4 (1952).
28 For a defense of the theoretical right of the people to change an unworkable constitution by whatever means they may choose, sec White, supra note 27, at 1137-38.
29See Taylor v. Commonwealth, IOI Va. 829, 44 S.E. 754 (1903); Miller v. Johnson,
9~ Ky. 589, 18 S.W. 522 (1892); Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59 (1874).
30 THE Boo!\'. OF STATIS 13.
~I Id.
12 E.g., Indiana, New Jersey, North Dakota and Vermont. Id.
3~ Id.
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There has been debate as to whether a convention may be called by
popular initiative in those states which permit the use of this device for
constitutional amendment. 3 ~ \Vhile the answer to this question is likely to
depend in large part upon the terms of the constitutional clause authorizing
the initiative and upon the receptiveness of the particular state to consti•
tutional change, the procedure of initiative is an expression of democratic
values and thus should be allowed unless there is some overwhelming prac•
tical reason why the people should be required to act through their representatives on this matter. One such reason might be that constitutional
change should not be too easy-that the interposition of the experience and
legal knowledge of the legislature is necessary to guarantee that the constitution will not be unduly subjected to ephemeral popular passions. However,
the same protection could presumably be achieved by establishing a high
vote requirement for successful popular initiative. And it should be remembered that the initiative is but the first step in a lengthy process; the convention itself should function as a protection against rash changes. While
an ill-considered popular initiative would result in the public expense of a
fruitless convention, this expense is surely a prerogative of the people.
Indeed, there are eight states with constitutional provisions that not only
provide for the popular initiative but also require that the question of holding a constitutional convention be submitted to the voters periodically.35

The Referendum on the Convention
In all but ten states the passage of a legislative resolution is but the first
step in authorizing a constitutional convention.36 Voter approval must also
be obtained in a referendum. 37 The question put to the voters is usually
34 See Goldings, The Use of the Popular Initiative Petition for a Constit111icmnl
Com,ention Act, 47 MASS. L.Q. 367 (1962). Goldings argues th2t such a use of the
iniriative is consistenr with the Massachusetts constitution. Compare Grine!!, Doe,
the Initiative and Referendum Amendment Authorize an Initiative Petition for Another
Constitutional Convention?, 9 MAss. L.Q. 35 (1924).
85 Alask2, low2 and Hawaii require rhe quesrion to be submitted to che voters every
10 ye2rs; Michigan, every 16 years; 2nd M2ryland, Missouri, New York and Oklahoma,
every 20 years. THE BooK OF STATES 13.
86 Id. at 13. Even if a referendum is not required, it m2y be desinble to 2scert2in
popular sentiment and avoid the wasce involved in calling a convention if ics product
is unlikely to be ratified.
37 In at least one inscance, populn approv2l for calling 2 convention h25 been
jQdiclally required even where the constitution did not demand it. In IJeMen •·
Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, 116 N.E. 921 (1917), che court held char, where rhe people h2d
previously voted against calling a convention, the legislature could noc c21l for a new
convention wichouc requiring a second referendum. This case is discussed, 2nd cricicized,
more extensively in White, supra note 27, at 1137-38.
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"shall a constitutional convention be called?" 18 Constitutions spesking to
the point usually require that the question be submitted to the people at the
next general election following the legislative action."

11le proporrloll of die

Yote

rtqllired f«

11lnnati011

of the aeferead•

ttries tmong the states. In nine states a majority of all persons voting in the
election must affirm the proposition.•0 This requirement has hindered the
calling of a convention since those who vote for an office-seeker but not
on the convention issue are counted with those who voted against the
propo~tion.
.
This difficulty may be met rather easily in most states by holding a
special election. Three states require a certain minimum p~oportion, but Jess ·
than a majority, of the total vote. This approach has been praiscd 41 for preventing the danger that the convention will be called by too small a
minority while avoiding the possibility of inaccurate representation of the
popular will. In the remaining states requiring a referendum. a simple
majority of those voting on the proposition is sufficient to pass it. This
procedure seems unsatisfactory because it may allow a well-mobilized
· minority to authorize a convention when a majority of the people are
opposed to change and will probably vote against the final product.
The requirement of a referendum as a prerequisite to the calling of a
convention po~es the problem of educating the public to the need for
change. The proponents of change will have to overcome or combat certain recurrent negative attitudes. There will be a virtually automatic aversion to change on the part of those with a vested interest in the status quo.41
Others may object because of 1• :i almost religious belief that fundamental
law is immutable and that to tamper with it is to desecrate it." 'rJle educational task should be simplest when the legislature and executive advocate
revision. As the Maryland experience indicates, circulation of flyers may
as STURM, supra note U, at 90.
HIJ. at 89.
40THEBOOJCoFSTAlES 13.
STUttM, tupr• note IS, at 91.
U The polarization of attitudes during the 1961 Michigan convention is an ~umplc.
Generally, those groups which represented general interest in good government, such
as the Junior Chamber of Commerce, League of Women Voters ind PTA. supported
rdonn. while organizations which represented more specific economic ind YOCadoml
inttrens, such as a.,;sociations of bankers, sheriffs, manufac:turcrs, highway contncton.
and the Grange, opposed at least parts of it, evidently in fear of I possible encroachment on their status. A. Sru1M, CoNST1TV110N-MA1t1NG IN M101ICAN 2S-26 M. U, U
(1963).
41 Hindman, Road-Blocks to CM1W11tion1, J7 NAT'L MUN. REY. 1·29, IJI-J2 (1941)
describes these attitudes:
(T)here is the citizen who has the approach indictted in Kenrucky: "If it was
good enou~h for grandfather it is good enough for me." Rebted to this ls the
point of view reported from Missouri in the slogan: "'Why rewrite the Dible?"
41
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be sufficient when the circulati1 ,1t has been undertaken at the Governor's
direction.•• When such official support is lacking, the task will fall to
various civic and special interest groups. Although educating the people
appears more difficult in this situation, the results of the Michigan convention, wl1ich was supported by groups such as the Junior Chamber of Commerce, the League of Women Voters, and the PTA, 45 prove that it can be
done effectively.
ASSEMBLING THE CoNVENTION

After an affirmative response in a popular referendum, a constitutional
convention does not automatically spring into existence. Except in the rue
cases where the details of the convention are set forth in the resolution submitted to the people,•0 the legislature must enact further legislation in reference to the convention anti the election of delegates. The degree to which
these details arc constitutionally prescribed or committed to legislative discretion varies from state to state.47
A positive referendum vote imposes a duty on the legislature to pass the
required enabling legislation. 48 But this obligation may be unenforceable''
since it is unlikely tftat mandamus will issue against the legislature; t~us the
legislature which has changed its collective mind since passing the resoluti(?n calling for the convention may succ~sfully defy the popular will, at
least until the next general election. In those states which do not require a
referendum, the legislature would presumahly authorize the convention arid
enable it to operate in the same act.
T~e legislature must consider many political variables and convention
•• This excellent series of flyers is reprinted in MARYLA1''D REPORT OF THE CoNmn,575-94 (1967).
45 See note 42 supra.
•a The Maryland General Assembly simultaneously enacted two bills, one providing
for a popular referendum and the other calling the convention if the lint D\et with a
fa,·orable response. MARYLAND llEPoRT, supra note 44 at 451.
47 SroRM, supra .note IS at 91-103; ShuU, Legislat111e a11d 1be Procesr of Constitlltion,I
Amendment, H Kv. L.J. HI (1965).
48 STURM, supra note IS at 91. The existence of the duty is shown by the \ISC of the
word 'shall' in many state constitutional provisions directing the legislature to provide for the elecrion of delegates. E.g., VA. CoNST. an. XV, S 197.
49 See \\!ells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39 ( 1874), where the court commented:
[The vote in favor of calling the convention) was not even a mandate, funhcr
man the mcinl f ~ COMtined in .,. ~ d
of the people. It ii very
die IMCm
11M dw lqWerwr1 W fflde no cal.• .
convention and no terms would ever have existed':" Not a line, nor a word, nor
a syllable in this act expresses an inrent of the people to make the call themselves, ·
or on what terms it shall be made, or what powers should be conferred.
Id. at 50-51; Note, The Constitutional Convention, Its Nature and Puu.·CTs-And tbt
Amending Procedure, 10 UTAH L. REV. 390, 397 (1966).
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needs in its enabling act. Among the most important are the number, qualifications, apportionment and compensation of delegates, the time and place
of the convention, and the method of pre-convention research.

Selection of Delegates
The only generalization that can be made regarding the proper number
of delegates is that it should be neither so small that it does not reflect
accurately the di,·erse interests of the people nor so large that effective
operation of the convention is impossible. Administrative convenience may
dictate selecting a number of delegates which corresponds to the number
of members in one house of the state legislanire.llO If the larger house is too
large or the smaller house too small, the easiest thing to do may be to
allocate several convention members to each district represented in the
~maller house.
Apportionment for the election of delegates should ordinarily follow
the lines of existing legislative districts. However, if the legislature is
unequally apportioned, it is arguable that the election of delegates to the
convention may be enjoined on the ground that it violates the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The principle of "one man one
vote" enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims5 1 in 1964 is one of the most important
principles of current Constitutional jurisprudence, and it is clear that the
principle applies to convention delegate selection if the state's constitutional
jurisprudence allows the constitution drafted by the convention to take
effect without popular ratification. The question still unresolved is whether
the principle extends to constitutions which are not effective until ratified
by the people.
If a constitution is subject to direct popular ratification, it is arguable
that the convention does not adopt fundamental law but merely proposes it.
In its most recent extension of the "one man one vote" principle, the Supreme
Court applied the principle to a county commissioners court. 62 The Court
was careful to point out, however, that its application reached a local unit
of government which exercised "general governmental powers over the
entire geographic area served by the body." Gs A constitutional convention,
like a commissioners court, may have the "power to make a large number
of dedsions having a broad range of impact on all citizens,"~ but it is not
a governing body. The Court has refused to apply the Reynolds v. Sims
50 Sn:RM, supra note 15 at 93-94. The constitutions of six states contain provisions
on the qualifications of delegates. Id. at 94. Several others imply that they shall possess
the same qualifications as members of one of the two houses of the legislature. Id.
61

377 U.S. 533 (1964).

Avery v. Midland County, 36 U.S.L.W. 4257 (U.S. April 2, 1968).
U Id. at 4260. Its specific powers are enumerated at 4257-58, 4259.
u Id. at 4259.

62
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principle to a county school board because the board performed an essentially administrative, nonlegislative function. 55 Yet the Court indicated, in
the same opinion, that the function of a particular body is not necessarily
dispositive. 56 Any abso.lute distinction between a governing and nongoverning body may therefore be untenable, especially in the context of the
constitutional convention which serves an unusually significant function.
Only one Justice has ever written on the point. In Forston v. Toombs 61
the majority vacated and remanded on procedural grounds ai1 injunction
issued by a federal district court which restrained Georgia election officials
from placing a proposal to adopt an amendment to the state constirution on
the ballot until the state legislature was reapportioned. Mr. Justice Harlan,
writing for himself and Mr. Justice Stewart, objected to this disposition of
the case, arguing that the lower court decree was improper on the merits.
According to Justice Harlan the composition of the body which proposes
constitutional change should not be subject to the Reynolds v. Sims principle, 58 regardless of whether the legislature or a convention initiates the
change.119
While only two lower federal courts80 have spoken to the issue of apportionment of convention elections, several state courts have dealt directly
with the question. The supreme court of West Virginia 61 held that a statute
governing the choice of convention delegates contravened the state constitutional provision requiring that " [ e] very citizen ... be entitled to equal
representation in the government, and, in all apportionments of representation, equality of number of those entitled thereto . . . be preserved." 62
In the absence of a similar state constitutional command, the state courts
are split. 63 But regardless of the resolution of the apportionment issue in the
Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
If we assume arguendo that where a State provides for an election of a local
official or agency, the requirements of ••• Reynolds v. Sims must be met, we
are still short of an answer to the present problem . • . •
Id. at 109.
67 379 U.S. 621 (1965).
68 /d. ar 626.
69 /d. at 626 n.3.
60 Butterwonh v. Dempsey, 237 F. Supp. 302 (D. Conn. 1965); Toombs v. Fortson,
205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), rev'd 01J other grounds, 379 U.S. 621 (1965).
61 Smith v. Gore, 150 W. Va. 71, 143 S.E.2d 791 (1965).
62 W. VA. CoNsT. arr. II, § 4.
63 Compare Jackman v. Bodine, 43 N.J. 453, 205 A.2d 713 (1964), with West v.
Carr, 212 Tenn. 367,370 S.W.2d %9 (1963).
The Maryland Constitutional Convention Commwion decided that the Supreme
Court rulings did not require the application of the "one man one vote" principle
in selecting convention delegates. MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 44 at 483. The official
flyers dismissed the apponionment question by stating that the "constitutional interpretation does not apply at the vote to be taken to elect convention delegates because this
66

68
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courts, sound policy dictates that population be the basic criterion for
apportioning representation in the Convention.

Not only c1n

■

poorly

■pportioncd

conYcntion lead to • constitution

biased toward particular groups, but unfair apportionment of the
delegates in itself can render the whole document suspect, regardless
of .its merits and engender sufficient hostility among the people to
threaten its acceptance. 64

Co111pemt1tion of Delegates
Delegates should be compensated sufficiently to attract qualified people
to candidacy, but the salary should not provide an incentive to prolong
deliberations.t 5 Delegates should be encouraged to consider their task as a
full-time undertaking, should be compensated accordingly, and should be
recompensed for their reasonable expenses. State legislative salaries may in
most instances prove viable guidelines.

Time and ~lace of the Convention
In determining the appropriate site for the convention, the legislature
should consider both physical and less tangible factors. Of necessity, there
must be a large meeting room, an ample supply of conference rooms, press
rooms, office space, and conveniently located living accommodations. The
atmosphere should be conducive to the intensive and deliberate pursuit of
con~titution-making. Most recent conventions have been held in either the
state capital or in a university town. Other factors being equal, the academic atmosphere is probably preferable. New Jersey, for example, chose
to locate the convention at Rutgers Universi~y:
While the distance between New Brunswick and Trenton is short in
miles, the political distance between the Rutgers Universi~ gymnasium and the State House is considerably greater.68
A reasonable time limit should be placed on the duration of the convention. Unlimited deliberations breed factionalism and delay and may prowill be a special election." Id. at 575. But the question was somewhat academic since
the state's legislative districts had been recently reapportioned and it was this reapportioned districting scheme th;it w;is utilized for the election of delegates. Id. at 484.
64 /d. ;it 483, quotfrzg from J. WHEELER, Tm: Coms1nrr10NAL CoNVENTION 33 (1961).
65 At Je;ist one observer felt that the limitation on payment of salaries to seven and
one-half months was a more powerful encouragement to the Michigan delegates th;in.
any time limits placed on the convention itself. A. SroRM, CoNSTinrrtoN-MAKING IN
MICHIGAN 84 (1963).
eo Bebout & Sady, Staging a State Co11stit11ti011al Co11venti011, in STATl'. CoNSTrnrrtONAL
REvtstoN 76 ('V. Graves ed. 1960).
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duce a listlessness among the delegates. No mandatory time limit was placed
on the Rhode Island Convention, and it remained in a state of suspended
animation for well over two years. 67 Six months of concentrated effort
should ordinarily suffice if the convention has been preceded by ample
research.

Preco11ve11tio11 Research
Every convention held since World War II has been preceded by a
comprehensive research effort. The research 'may be undertaken by various
groups including an official commission, a university study group, or ad hoc
civic organizations. Of these groups, the official commission is most likely
to receive extensive financial support and to be prestigious enough to attract
high calibre, knowlcdgable personnel. However, the commission has the
potential disadvantage of being a creature of either the legishture or the
executive. Its effectiveness will be severely limited if its membership consists of partisan political appointees or if its scope of inquiry has heen confined. University studies, while less subject to the risks inherent in official
control, may suffer from insufficient financial resources. Civic groups
dominated by particular classes or interests may have more adequate resources but may tend to produce self-interested results.
THE AUTHORITY OF A CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTION

The convention is brought into legal existence upon the performance of
constitutionally and legislatively prescribed acts. Complex questions may
arise concerning its legal narure, powers and limitations. The Federal Constirution imposes obvious limitations upon the convention. It cannot, for
example, institute a monarchy or impose an ex post facto law. 68 It has
generally been held, however, that special limitations imposed upon a state
as a condition to its admission to the Union will not bind a subsequent state
constitutional convention.69
In areas not governed Qy the Federal Constitution, arguments regarding
the authority of the convention have drawn upon two polarized theoretical
approaches. One approach stresses the role of the com·ention as the creator
of the highest law and as the embodiment of the sovereign popubr will. In
its extreme form, this view has amounted to a natural law assertion that the
convention itself possesses sovereignty. 70 A less extreme variant of this
"Wuhinaton Pmr, Mey 211, 1967, at Bl, col. a.

es Frantz v. Autry, 180 Okla. 561, 590, 91 P. 193, 203 (1907); State v. Keith, 63 N.C.
140 (1869); Note, Tbe Constitutional C011Vmtion, Its Nature and Powers-And tbe
Amending Procedure, 10 UTAII L. REv. 390, 401 (1966).
69 E.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
10See, e.g., Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. Ill, 117, 36 P. 424, 426 (1894) (dictum);
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theory concludes that, where the existing constitution so provides, the convention is the direct voice of the people. 71
The opposing theory stresses the limitations inherent in a convention
which is merely the agent or the people and which owes its very existence
to extant law, especially to the legislative act establishing it. In its most
extreme form this approach regards the convention as a purely legislative
crearure which may be completely circumscribed by legislative acts.12
Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 555, 14 N.W. 738, 744 (1883) (dictum); McMullen v.
Hodge, 5 Tex. 34, 43 (1849) (dictum).
At the New York constitutional convention of 1821, Mr. Livingston, one of the
delegates declared
Sir, the people are here themselves. They are present by their delegates. No
restriction limits our proceedings . . . . Sir, we are standing upon the foundations
of society.
Quoted in \Vhite, supra note 27 at 1139-40. An even more fervent delegate at the
1847 Illinois convention argued
We are the sovereignty of the State. We are what the people of the State would
be if they were congregated here in one mass meeting. We are what Louis XIV
said he was, "We are the State?" We can trample the Constitution under our
feet as waste paper, and no one can call us to account save the people.
J. JAMESON, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS 303 (4th ed. 1887), quoted 111 White, supra
note 27 at 1140.
A similar but more s0phisticated and restrained view is taken by Gooch, The Recent
Limited Constitutional Convention in Virginia, 31 VA. L. REv. 708, 725-26 (1945). He
argues, in effect, thar since the constitution is the highest law, the authority to amend
it possessed by the convention is the highesr authority, and that, by hypothesis, there
is no higher form of law to limit the convention.
11 Thus, a fairly recent South Carolina document declares that
The South Carolina Constitution of 1895 clearly srates that once a constitutional convention meets, its delegates are to all intents and purposes the people
of South Carolina in convention assembled . As such, the delegates exercise all
the power of the people. As a practical matter ••• the electors . • • could not
bind the convention.
R. UHL, R. STOUIJEMIRE & G. SHERRILL, CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS: ORGANIZATION,
PowE.Rs, Fi:NCTIONS AND PROCEDURES 19 (1951).
72 Judge Black in the Pennsylvania convention of 1873 argued:
Suppose the Legislature had seen proper to say that we should not assemble at
all, or that we should make no amendments to the Constitution ••• then the
question is, whether we could, in defiance of that mandate, assemble ourselves
together in Convention, representing, as we do, the whole people of the Commonwealth, and against the will of the people, and against the authority of the
organized government now existing, proceed to alter the body of it. I say we
could not do that. That would be revolutionary. Where do we get the power?
\\there docs it come from? Nobody will deny ,that we are setting here in pursuance of certain acts of the legislature . . . . If we derive our power from that
source, is it possible thar we can take it without rhe limitations that were imposed upon it by those who created it? I don't think the question can be answered
in my but one way.
DEBA1r.s oF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTION 157 (Pa. 1873), quoted in White, supra
note 27 at I H0-41 n. 29.
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Such an extreme pos1uon is untenable, however; the convention is not a
mere agent of the legislature since the legislature itself cannot resolve itself
into a constitutional convention. 78
The prevailing view accepts neither of these theories in toto. On the one
hand, the convention is not regarded as a supreme sovereign and may not
usurp the powers of the existing branches of the government. For example,
with certain rare exceptions, it may not pass ordinary legislation,74 but
rather is limited to the specific task of writing a new constitution.15 On the
other hand, the prevailing view tends to treat the convention not as an agent
of the legislature but as a unique legal entity, especially when the convention has an independent constitutional source.
Two problems in particular have generated disputes concerning the
authority of the constitutional convention. First, the power of the convention to revise the constitution without popular ratification was long a
source of debate; however, this is no longer a disputed issue in most states
and will be treated in the section of this Note discussing the ratification
process. 78 The second and most currently controversial issue concerns
the validity of limitations placed by the legislature on the scope of convention activity.
There is authority to the effect that such limitations imp·osed by the
legislature are invalid.77 This view reflects the theory of convention sovereignty, and may draw upon the argument that the legislature by calling
a limited convention deprives the electorate of the opportunity to call an
unlimited convention. However, the most prevalent view upholds such
restrictions as impliedly ratified by the people through their endorsement
of the convention or election of delegates. 78 Under this view the limit:itions
·are theoretically imposed by the people rather than the legislature,7 11 and
the complex question of the relationship of convention to legislature is
73 See In re Opinion to the Governor, SS N.J. 56, 97-98, 178 A. 433, 452 (1935);
Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1 (1912), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 250 (1913).
See Note, Co,mitutional Revision by a Restricted Convention, 35 MINN. L. REV.
283, 290-92 (1951) and authorities cited therein.
75 R. HoAR, CONSTITUTIONAL U>NVENTJONS 11 (1917); White, supra note 27 at 1145.
76 Sec note 149 infra.
77 See Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 632, 33 S.E.2d 49, 54-55 (1945) (dictum); Sproule
v. Fredericks, 69 Miss. 898, 11 So. 472 (1892); W. Dooo, THE REv1s10N AND AMENDMENT
ov STATE C<>NrnnmoNs 80 (1910); Gooch, The Recent Limited C011stituti011al Conventi011 in Virginia, 31 VA. L. REv. 708 (1945).
78 Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 33 S.E.2d 49 (1945); accOTd, Cummings v. Beeler, 18~
Tenn. ISi, 223 S.W.Jd 9IJ (1949h State v. American Sugu Retinins Co., 137 La. 407,
68 So. 742 (1915); Opinion of the Justices. 60 Mass. (6 Cush,) 573 (188J). Ste also
J. JAMESON, U>NSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 350 et seq. (4th ed. 1887).
79 See, e.g., Gaines v. O'C<innell, 305 Ky. 397, 204 S.W.2d 425 (1947); Sproule v.
Fredericks, 69 Miss. 898, 11 So. 472 (1892); Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59 (1874); R. HoAII,
Cosrnn;110NAL CoNVENTIONS 121 (1917); White, supra note 27 at 1142.
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thereby avoided. Of course, if the constitution itself specifies that the convention be unlimited, that provision will control.
The limitation-by-the-people theory requires a decision as to when the
statutory restrictions take effect. One writer contet1ds that the election of
delegates places the stamp of populu approval on the restrictions. 80 Another asserts that the limitations may be ratified only by the vote on the
question of calling the convention. 81 Actual legislative practice renders this
distinction significant. It will be recalled that the legislature usually passes
two acts-one providing for a referendum on whether a convention should
be called and, upon an affirmative vote, a second establishing the machinery for the convention. It would appear more consistent with the limitation-by-the-people theory that the legislature be precluded from restricting
the convention after the first referendum. 82 In any case, legislative attempts
to limit the convention after it has been assembled have never been sustained. 83
In addition to the authority to draft a constitution, the convention possesses certain inherent internal powers, absent a constitutional provision
confining such powers.84 The convention's internal authority includes the
power to organize itself, elect officers, preserve its records, hire and fire
employees and perhaps, in the absence of a contrary limitation, provide for
submitting its work to the people.St! It may have the power to discipline
its members, although expulsion is the most extreme penalty it may imWhite, supra note 27 at 1141-42, citing Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59 ( 1874) .
Nore, The Comtitutional Convention, Its Nature and Power1-And the Amending
Procedure, 10 UTAH L. REv. 390,404 (1966).
82 Id.
83 White, supra note 27 at 1142.
84 Goodrich v. Moore, 2 Minn. 61 (1856); SroRM, supra note 15 at 98; Dodd, State
Constitutional Co11ve11tiom and State Legislative Power, 2 VAND. L. REv. 27, 31 (1948).
Some state constitutions specifically grant this authority to the convention. For
example, DEL. CoNST. art. XVI, S 2 provides:
The Convention shall have power to appoint such officers, employees, and as,isrants as it may deem necessary, and fix their compensation, and provide for
the printing of its documents, journals, debates and proceedings. T he Convention
shall determine the rules of its proceedings, and be t he judges of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its members.
The Hawaii constitution simply statl'S that "The convention shall determine its own
organization and rules of procedure." HAWAII CoNST, art. XV, S 2. See Mo. CoNST.
an. X, S 10.04 (as adopted by the convention). Moreover, the few state constitutions
which include provisions governing the power of the convention are not necessarily
restrictive. The Missouri constitution goes so far as to grant the convention the
authority to "appropriate money for the expenditures incurred." Mo. CoNST. art.
XII, S 3b.
BS \Vhitc, supra note 27 at J 146.
80

81
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pose. 88 Conventions have sometimes exercised the power of calli ng witnesses, but it is unclear whether they could discipline someone fo r failing
to appear. 87 Generally speaking, the convention is dependent for fu nds on
appropriations from public officials and the legislature,iis although it has been
suggested that it has ·authority to take steps necessary to secure its own
comfort, to protect and foster its dignity and efficiency, and to insure the
orderly procedure of its business. 80
THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE CoNVENTION

Up to this point, discussion of the convention method of constitutional
change has been essentially legalistic. The major questions in calling and
assembling the convention are legal questions. In contrast, the problem of
successfully organizing the convention so that its work may be done in an
effective and expeditious manner is primarily a practical one.

The Partisanship Issue: General Commems
The constitutional convention involves frequent exercise and mobilization
of the popular will-to convoke the convention, to elect the delegates, and
to ratify the proposed document. Consequently a study of the convention
method must consider the activity of the political party-the usual institutional apparatus for this mobilization-and the effect of this activity upon
the various phases of the convention, the public image of the convention,
and the success of its product. A consideration of the convention activity
of political parties ultimately raises the question of whether the election of
delegates should be conducted on a partisan or nonpartisan basis.
When convention delegates are chosen on a prtisan basis, the party struccure usually will enable the majority party to control the convention. This
control will extend not only 'to organizational aspects of the convention
such as the selection of procedures, committee structure and committee
members, but also to the substance of the final document. Moreover, irn\ portant decision-making in a partisan convention may be made in party
/ caucuses, removed from public scrutiny and minority party dissent.90 Party

1

88 Note, The Conrtitutional Convention, Its Nawre and Powers-A nd the Amending
ProcedUTe, 10 UTAH L. REv. 390,409 (1966).
81 /d.
88 White, supra note 27 at 1146.
II J. JAMES01'1, Col'lmnmoNAL CoNvENTIOl'II 4H-S6 (4th ed. 1887).
vo During the Michigan convention, both Democrats and Republicans held frequent
caucuses, particularly during the later phases of the convention. T he Democratic
caucuses proved more effective although they were criticized for pressure tac tics. The
Republicans complained of inept caucus leadership and of the chairmen's insistence that
their own views be accepted. Nonetheless, despite poor attendance, these meetings
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meetings of delegates held soon after their election may substantially organize the convention before it is convoked. This was the case, for example,
in Michigan where the Republican Party held a pre-convention organizational mceting. 11 On the other h:md, while a nonpartis:tn convention witl
certainly cont:iin cohesive groups which represent similar geographic, political or economic interests, it will probably lack the institutionalized
party stnicture necessa ry to unite and control disparate interests.
The specific effects of partisan elections in a given state will of course
depend upon the disipline and belligerency of the st.ate's parties and upon
the character of the party leadership. The N ew York and Michigan conventions illustrate concretely the advantages and disadvantages of a partisan
convention. Both states have strong two-party sy stems. 82 In New York,
only a slight Democratic majority (98 to 88) was elected. But party ma3
chinery was so effective that the Democrats were able to dominate the ~
convention and write what was in essence a one-pany conscitution.93 Over
unified Republican objection, the Democrats defeated a proposal for _separate ratification vote of :i controversial provision concerning state aid to
parochial schools. Through strict party voting, the Democrats shaped the
final document to provide for state assumption of many public welfare
obligations and for free college educ:ition of state residents. 94 The s~rict
adherence to party lines was criticized as discouraging the kind of negotiation that would ha ve resulted in constructive compromise and enabled
were imponant instruments of policy guidance and helped develop a greater consensus
among pany meml,as. A. SruRM, CoNSTtnlTION-MAKJNG IN MICHIGAN 111-12 (1963).
91 /J.
92 Thomas, Micbigrn's Parry System: Blessing or Curse?, in PARTIES AND Pouncs
IN MICHIGAN 3-14 (1961).
93 Some w ere of the opinion that it was the work not only of one party, but of one
man in that party. An thony Tra\·ia. speaker of the State Assembly and an old hand
at manipulating pany machinery, was elected president of the convention on a straight
partisan vote. He w as reponed to ha\·e "developed his control over the delegates to
the point w here he {had) the final say in how the new charter [would look)." Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1967, at F 14, cols. 1-4 (quote at col. 2).
Assembly Speaker Travia, in a speech on February 16, 1967, at Syracuse University,
stated: "I believe in short conventions, short constitutions, and short speeches." At
the same speech he stated that "this Convention, if it is to succeed, must be 'Open with
a capital O' and 'democratic with a small d.'" T he post-mortem caused Robert
McKay, Dean of the Ne w York University School of Law, to remark: "Unfortunately,
it was in fact more 'closed w it h a small (;' and 'democratic with a capital D.'" McKay,
Conrriwrional R w ision in N ew YOf'k State: Disaster in 1961, 19 SYRACUSE L. Rzv. 207,
217 (1967) .
94 \\'ashington Post, Sept. 7, 1967, at F14, cols. 1-4; id., at FIS, cols. 1-7. It was
reported that the convention "quickly became infused w ith party politics. The Democrats controlled the gathering and almost every controversial issue was pushed through
br them o\·er the objections of the Republican minority.'' New York Times, Nov. 8,
1967, at 30, col. I.
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both parties to support the final document. 95 The proposed constitution
was opposed both by the Republican party and by interest g roups which
were antagonistic to controversial provisions. As a result of this opposition,
a 2 ½ to 1 majority of voters rejected the constitution, which had b~cn
drafted at a cost of ten million dollars.98
•
In Michigan, the voters elected a 2 to 1 Republican majority.97 Although
rural conservative Republicans and urban Democrats usually vied for control of the statehouse with roughly equal success, the convention election
was marked by large inroads into suburba~ areas by moderate Republicans.
Thus there were in e.ffect three political groups represented-liberal Democrats, moderate Republicans, and conservative Republicans. 98 This split prevented the Republicans from utilizing their majori ty as effectively as the
New York Democrats.
The Michigan experience illustrates the pervasive influence of extraconvcntion political factors upon convention activity. Although aspects of
convention organization such as allocation of committee cl1:1 irmanships and
membership were drawn along parry lines, the convention did not plunge
immediately into party combat. However, a gradual deterioration of bi\ partisan unity culminated in the mid-convention announcement by George
Romney, its moderate Republican vice-president, of his gubernatorial candidacy. The parties then drew ranks for the upcoming elections and any
possibility of interparry compromise was effectively foreclosed. 99 Romney,
desiring to unite the party for his campaign, negotiated a package compromise with conservative Republicans which literally became the new
constitution. 100 This action was vigorously denounced by the Democrats. 101

?
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96 Ostwald, How Not to Hold a State Con-Con, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 1967,
at 18, col. 3.
H New York Times, Nov. 9, 1967, at 1, cols. 6-7, at 31, col. 1. See Schanberg, What
NO'ID fo1' New York Constitution?, New York Times, Nov. 12, 1967, at E3, cols. 6-7.
VT A. STh'llM, CoNsnnmoN-MAKING IN M1cmGAN 44.-45 (1963).
98 /d. at 105-109 (1963).
sv /d. at 109-27.
100 Id. at 117-22, Professor Pollack, himself a delegate, rcpons that:
When Republican factionalism threatened to split the Convention and endanger
the enactment of a new, modern constitution, Mr. George Rom ney emerged as
an effective leader in unifying Republican views. This was about mid-way in
the Convention, and from that point forward, he was the leader who, in most
important matters, was able to produce majority agreemenr. This subjected him
co much vilification by the Democrats, who finally broke with the large Convention majority and voted against adoption of the Constitution.
J. PoU-Aca:, MAXING MtctnGAN'■ NEw CoNmnmoN 42 (196? ).
101 It is with great shock :ind sorrow that we read there has been a deal by the
majority delegates to write a constitution without participation of all the delegates. More decisions have apparently been made off the floor in secret meetings
than are being made on the convention floor.
Detroit Free Press, March 17, 1962, at 8.
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Moreover, several other delegates announced their candidacy for political
office at the same time. In short, according to one delegate, "[e]fforts for
political self-preservation were abundantly evident in the Michigan convention." 102 This extensive involvement in political campaigns adversely
affected the com•ention's public image; many citizens naturaily feared thit
personal political ambitions weighed too heavily in the voting of the Poli tically involved delegates on important constitutional issues.103
Despite the adverse effects of partisanship and despite the prevalent opinion that "(i]t made the convention's work harder than it should [have
been]," 104 the conventi<•n did accomplish its task successfully. The proposed document was ratified by a substantial margin. Furthermore, a majority of the delegates apparently thought the partisan organization was,
on the whole, an advantage in their e.ffon, for they voted sixty-seven to
fifty-seven to provide for partisan elections in futu re conventions. 10ll One
delegate favored partisan elections because he thought they encour.iged
more qualified candidates to run and avoided the election of irreconciliable
interest groups. 106
In contrast to Michigan and New York, Maryla nd delegates were elected
on a nonpartisan basis, and less than one-half of the delegates had ever been
political officeholders. "It took newsmen several days to son out which
delegates were Democrats or Republicans or ind.'pendents." 107 Delegates
largely voted as their consciences dictated and freely changed their minds,
since they owed their allegiance to no particular parry.1°8 The only visible
disad\'antage of the nonpolitical atmosphere was that "the convention floundered during every major floor debate, but this was disastrous in only a
few instances." 109 Leaders gradually emerged, and "[i ] nterestingly .enough,
none of those who contributed the most to the writi ng of the new constitution [was] an active politician." llO The leaders tended to be natural leaders
A. STURM, Cc>NSTITUTION-MAKING IN MICHIGAN 127 (1963 ).
at 117.
104 State Journal (Lansing), April 17, 1962, at 7 A.
105 MtcmGAN Cc>NVENTION JouRNAL, No. 135, May 9, 1962, at 1292.
10s J. PoLL'ICK, MAKING M1CH1GAN's NEw Cc>Nsnn:110N 16 (1962).
One factor that <liminished the political ovenones of the Michigan convention was the
decision to seat delegates alphabetically rather than by party or district. This encouraged
,ome spirit of unity and facilitated compromise. Id. at 25. The Maryland convention
followed suit and seated delegates alphabetically. \Vashington Post, Sept. 7, 1967, at Fl,
~01. 4.
101 \Vashington Post, Jan. 7, 1968, at Bl, col. S.
108 \Vashington Post, J~n. 7, 1968, at Bl, cols. S-6, at Bi, col. 6.
1011 Washington Post, Jan. 7, 1968, at 82, col. 6.
llO \.\"ashington Post, Jan. 11, 1968, at Al6, col. 1. The editorial went on to note:
Th3t, in itself, may demonstrate why this convention was able to make so
m any far-reaching reforms in the document it h:is now presented to the people.
The entire process through which this proposed constitution has been written
102

10s Id.
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rather than party leaders. The non-politicians produced a document which
was "clearly the most advanced state constitution ever written." 111 The
Michigan and New York conventions ended on a note of acrim_ony ; "~1aryl land's closed in an atmosphere of pleasantries and virtual una nimity." 112
Nevertheless, the "draft constitution [ which] had been born and raised
~ in an atmosphere of pure democracy [was rejected by the sa me] demotic process by which it was drawn." 113
It is generally argued that partisan elections produce a greater number of
qualified delegates who are experienced with the workings of government.
Furthermore, party machinery promotes more efficient decision-making.
When the hard decisions must be made, party leaders know when and
where pressure must be applied, compromises made, and threats issued.
Consequently, they can prevent hopeless deadlock and muster the necessa1y
majority vote. Bur the high caliber of Maryland's apolitical delegates and
the leading role they pl~yed in writing the new constitution suggest that
partisan elections may discourage the candidacy of outstanding citizens not
closely linked with regular parties. 114 Furthermore, Maryland's experience
negates the argument that the party structure is necessary to avoid chaos
and prevent deadlock, since the only time lack of party structure had any
adverse effect was during floor debates.
On the whole, these convention studies provide strong support for the
basic arguments against partisan conventions. Partisan elections encourage
self-interested decision-making on matters at the heart of the public interest.
It has been noted, for example, that in the Michigan convention voting independence varied inversely with the intensity of political ambition. 115 It
~ is highly questionable whether decisions regarding the state's fundamental
). law are best made by party members who have one eye on pleasing party
leaders and the other on future political office. Of course t he influence of
( political parties will not be missing from conventions where delegates are
elected on a nonpartisan basis. Even the Maryland convention felt the
weight of such influence in the hard fights over the office of comptroller

J
l

is a demonstration of democracy at its finest. The delegates and the State can
only be richer because it came about this way.
111 Washington Post, Jan. 7, 1968, at 82, col. 6. The commentator noted earlier that:
One suspects, and it is only a suspicion, that if Maryland had the ir convention
to do over, it would not be the same. The political forces in the state would
not let it ger our of their control, as it often did.
\V. Brooke Graves, a specialist in state government, noted that ",\1aryland is giving
us a convention thar will serve as model for some time to come." \Vall Street Journal,

Pee. 6, 1967, at 10, col. 2.
Washington P~t, Jan. 11, 1968, at AI9, col. S.
Washington Post, {\fay 16, 1968, at A20, col. 1.
114 Ostwald, HO'UJ Not to Hold a State Co11-Co11, \Vall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 1967,
at 18, col. 3.
111

113

116
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106 (1963).

(which resulted in a compromise) and over single-member districts (won
by the reformers). 116 But while this influence cannot be purged from the
convention process, it can be minimized through the use of nonpartisan
elections. A nonpartisan convention will resemble more closely than a parti- )
san convention the idea! of a meeting of public spirited citizens who make \
decisions on the basis of merit alone.
It was widely felt that partisanship caused the defeat of the New York
document. Maryland, heeding the New York example, avoided partisanship
in an effort to dissipate the influence generated by announcements of support or opposition from political parties or interest groups. Adversaries of
constitutional reform are given powerful ammunition when one party
dominates the convention. However, when a nonpartisan convention
frames the document, a disgruntled party or interest group attacks not the
decision of another party or interest group but, in theory, the decision of
the very citizens it wishes to attract to its cause. In fact· Maryland did avoid
much of the normal political and interest group opposition to ratification.
Although both parties strenuously objected to some of the provisions proposed by the Maryland convention and although organized labor was disappointed by the rejection of a labor bill of rights, they all ultimately urged
ratification of the document. But the established political and interest groups
urged ratification in vain. "It was the rank and file trampling the officers;
the grass roots strangling the trees and the self-proclaimed little man deciding for himself what kind of government he would have." 117
The result in Maryland may cast doubt upon the viability of achieving
constitutional reform by the convention method. But perhaps Maryland
mo,·ed too quickly, too progressively. ~he Maryland
vote was explained by many . . . as an outgrowth of a widespread
fear of change during a period of social unrest and civil disorder
and resentment at the expansion of an already large government.
The fact that the document was pushed by urban liberals and labeled
as reform may have only increased the wariness of Maryland's traditionally conservative electorate.ll 8
This movement in part can be attributed to the unfettered nature of the
convention. Partisan bodies, in contrast, generally move incrementally
through compromise which never reaches an ideal but gradually improves
existing models. A partisan structure thus places a check upon the suddenness of constitutional change at the convention. But, although the partisan
\Vashington Post, Jan. 7, 1968, at Bl, cols. S-6; id. at 82, col. 6.
\Vashington Post, May 16, 1968, at AS, col. I.
118 /d.
116

117
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convention in most cases may be relied upon to prevent radical change, the
New York convention proved that such reliance may be misplaced. In the
final analysis, there is no reason why a nonparti~an conven tion should be
incapable of restricting it~ progress to what is tolerable co the populace. The
independent delegates must accept as part of their problem the fact that
there is a distance between their idealism and the reality of the limited
changes that the people may he willing to accept.

Convention Procedural Rules
With the exception of some modifications to allow informal deliberation
on the convention floor, most convention procedural rules closely follow
those used by the lower house of the state legislature. 119 Ordinarily convention procedural rules are brief, defining such things as the necessary majority and quorum, the officers of the convention and standing committees,
the powers of these respective bodies, the floor procedures as to deba;e and
the introduction of motions and drafts, and often the number and duties of
convention employees such as secretaries, clerks and reporters. For authority in the event of parliamentary conflict, many con ventions adopt such
comprehensive works as Robert's Rules of Order or Mason's Manual of
Legislative Procedure. 120 There is always the danger chat a relaxation of
normal legislative procedural rules will lead to prolonged and uninformative
debate, 121• or debate on proposals which are introduced by a delegate to
enhance his image with his constituents or his political superiors. 122 Limitations on debate are therefore necessary, provided they c:m be equally ap-119 See, e.g., M. FAUST, ORGANIZATIONAL MANUAL FOR THE M1ssoUR1 CoNSTJrunoNAL
CoNVENTION OF 1943 (1943); OFF1c1AL RuLES AooPnD BY THE CoNST1T1.TTIONA1. CoNVENTION OF NEw JERSEY (1947); MARYL~ND REPORT, rupra note 44 at 405-18; A. STUJtM.
CoNSTJTUTION-MAJUNG IN M1onGAN 78-79 (1963).
In Michigan, the preparatory commission drafted the procedural rules and outlined
the steps considered necessary for the convention's fi rst three sessions. These tentative
suggestions were generally followed by the delegates. STURM, id. at 55. Such a practice
seems advisable because it saves time and effects a more careful consideration of the procedural rules than would otherwise be made.
120 P. MASON, MAsoN's MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE FOR LEGISLATIVE AND OTiru:
GOVERNMENTAL Boo!Es (1953); H. RoB£RT, RoBERT's Ruu.s OF ORDER (rev, ed. 1951).
121 Detroit News, Feb. 27, 1962, at JOA (statement by delegate D. H ale Brake of the
Michigan Constitutional Convention). Other delegates agreed that there was too much
wasteful debate. Professor Pollack suggested adoption of the rule used by the New
Jersey Convention:
Defan a proposal shall be considered by me committee of she w hole, any delegate, the chairmen panicularly, shall be privileged to move a limitation upon
the time of debate and consideration by the committee and the committee may
fix in advance of consideration a time for the committee to rise and report.
pol.LACK, MAKING M1ouGAN's N1:.w CoNSTITUTION 39 (1962).
'
J,12A. STURM, CoNS'11TUTION-MAKING IN MIOflGAN 116-17 (1963).

1•

-30-

plied. It is often helpful to appoint an experienced parliamentarian or secretary to be available for consultation on procedural matters.1 23

Conmdttte Strueture
A substantial number of important convention decisions, like those of
other formal deliberative bodies, are made away from the convention floor.
It is inconceivable that the full convention could operate effectively without
preliminary decision-making by special committees composed of delegates
with kno,vledge and competence in particular areas.m These committees
generally are concerned with either substantive matters, such as the study .
and writing of particular articles in the new constitution, or procedural
matters, such as organization, publicity, and style and drafting. Typical
functions of the substantive committees include the following: ( 1) study
of existing provisions to ascertain past interpretation and practice, adequacy
in light of contemporary state needs, and areas where improvement is desirable; (2) consideration of proposed changes (possibly in conjunction
with public hearings), iz~ whether the proposals come from delegates, ex12a Michigan had great success with the appointment of Fred Chase as secretary. He
was the chief executive officer of the state Senate and was therefore experienced in
administrative and parliamentarian dmics. Id. at 64-65. The Maryland prep2racory
commission recommended a similar figure to the Maryland convention, with the following responsibilities:
The secretary shall he the chief 2dministr2tive officer of the Convention 2nd
shall be primarily responsible for its administration, under the direct authority
of the president. The secretary, under the supcn-ision and 2uthority of the
president, shall be responsible for the employment and assignment of personnel,
the supervision of payroll, the registration of lobbyists or any special interest
groups pursuant co any requirements imposed hJ• rule or resolution of the Convention, and communications with the press. He shall be director of the Convention's budget 2nd shall supervise the acquisition and care of facilities, services
and supplies needed by the Convention.
MARYLAND R.EPoRT, supra note 44 2t 408-09.
124 In the New Jersey Convention five substantive committees were created: Rights,
Privileges, Amendments and Miscellaneous Provisions; Legislative; Executive, Militia,
and Civil Officers; Judiciary; Taxation and Finance.
Michig2n had nine subsc2ntive committees: Declaration of Rights, Suffr2ge and
Elections; Legislative Organiz~tion; Legislath·e Powers; Executh·e Branch; Judicial
Branch; Finance and Taxation; Local Government; Educ2tion; and Miscellaneous Provisions and Schedule.
The Maryland Convention opened with committees as follows: Person2l Rights anJ
Preamble; Suffrage and Elections; Legislative Branch; Executive Branch; Judicial
Branch; Loc2l Government; Seate Finance 2nd Taxation; Geneul Provisions.
The subst2ntive committees of the Ahsk:i Convention were: Ordin3nces and Transitional 1\1eosurcs; Preamble and Bill of Rights; Suffrage, Elections and Apponionmenc;
Legislative Branch; Executive Branch; Judicial Branch; Resources; Finance and Tuation; Local Government; Disrrict Legislation, Amendment and Revision.
126 At the Michigan Convention, some committees h2d open meetings in Lansing and
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ternal organizations, or the committee itself; and (3) submission to the
convention of the committee proposal or alternative proposals, along with a
report explaining all relevant facts and arguments. 128
All recent conventions have had separate committees concerned with
each of the three branches of governrnent. 127 Occasionally, the convention
will divide these branch committees into two or more committees, as in
Michigan where there were separate committees on legislative organization
and legislative powers. 128 In addition to these three basic committees, there
usually is a committee concerned with the preamble, bill of rights, suffrage
and election provisions, and other matters nbt within the specific jurisdiction of another committee. 129 Also, there is ordinarily a separate committee concerned with taxation, finance and problems of local government.130 Although many variations are possible, these five substantive committees are all that are strictly necessary.
If past practice is any indication, most conventions will be unsuccessful in properly limiting the 11umber of committees. 131 For instance, the
New York convention of 1938 felt compelled to have separate committees
on matters such as Indian :itfairs and canals, and individual committee
treatment of cities, counties, towns and villages. 132 \Vhat often happens is
that the convention creates enough committees to insure that all delegates can
serve on at least one, that all convention leaders can obtain a committee
chairmanship 1 and that certain interest groups can obtain strategic representation in their areas of concern. The result can be disastrous. State constitlitions are almost universally too lengthy, yet each committee usually will
contribute some material to the proposed constitution. 133 As committees beother parts of the state where citizens could voice their opinions. J. Pou.ACK, I\IAKJNG
MICHIGAN'S NEW CONSTITUTION J2 (1962).
12 6 MrCHIGAN CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTION JouRNAL, No. 14, Oct. 26, 1961, at 7J. See
also A. SruRM, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN MICHIGAN 86 (1963).
121 Note 124 supra.
12s Note 124 supra.
129 Note 124 ropra.
130 See note 124 rupra. The financial crisis occurring in many cities would seem to
make financial matters and local government an ideal match. This is particularly so with
regard to the state tax structure, which should be integrated with municipal taxes,
county taxes, and property and sales taxes.
131 Although the New Jersey Convention showed admirable restraint, mpra note IH,
as a general rule too many substantive committees arc created. Id.
132 The 1967 New York Convention divided the work among fifteen standing c:ommittccs, a considerable diminution from the thirty-four that operated at the 1938 New
York Convention. McKay, Conrtitutio11al Re~irion in New York State: Disaster in 1967,
19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 207,219 (1967).
183 The excellent commentary that followed the Michigan convention reveals a feeling that too many committees were created, despite the fact that Michigan, in cornp:ui-
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come more numerous, their work becomes more detailed and jurisdictional
lines less precise. A successful constitution must be an internally integrated,
consistent and unified document. A mere accumulation of technical provisions drafted by many different hands will inevitably result in inconsistencies,
duplications, omissions, and inclusion of material more properly left to legislation. 134
In addition to the substantative committees, conventions invariably find
it necessary to establish certain operational or procedural committees. 135
Most conventions place the important work of integrating and polishing
the proposed or adopted constitutional language in a committee on style,
son with other conventions, created relatively few committees. Professor Sturm reports
that:
Practically all delegates interviewed agreed that the number of committees should
be kept small; some declared that one or two of the substantive committees
could have been omitted without causing the convention's work to suffer. The
consensus was that no delegate should serve on more than one substantive committee.
A. STURM, Co~snruTroN-MAKING IN MrcHIGAN 275 (1963).
134 An example of the types of committee jurisdictional problems that can arise is
noted by Professor Pollack who reports that, at the Michigan convention, a problem
arose as to whether gubernatorial elections were to be considered by the executive
committee or the elections commitree. J. POLLACK, MAKING M1CH1G~l'{•s NEw CoNsnTUTION 35 (1962).
\Vhen there is an abundant number of committees, it is often necessary to have
delegates serve on more than one committee. This presented a problem to the Michigan
convention, for the delegates had time to follow the proceedings of only one committee. Id. at 26-27.
Although it seems desirable to appoint delegates to committees which deal with topics
of particular interest to them, this can apparently be overdone. Of twenty-one members on the Michigan Judicial Committee, twenty were lawyers and the other 1
pharmacist. These specialists were unable to agree with one another, and their report
was unduly delayed. Ann Arbor News, May 12, 1962, at 12. Overlapping committee
assignments added to this burden. A. STURM, CoNSTITUTION-fllAKING tN M1cHIGAN 276
(1963). Furthermore, judicial matters are of general interest to the state and should
not be maJe the peculiar province of the lawyers. J. PoLLAcK, MAKING M1cH1GAN's NEw
CossnTUTION 24 ( 1962).
At Michigan there was also :i prohlem of keeping the convention informed of what
was going on in the committees. It was felt that problems should be considered by
delegates outside the particular committee before a proposal comes to the convention
floor. Id. at 35-36.
135 flfaryland haJ operational committ>!es on the following matters: Style, Drafting
and Arrangement; Calendar and Agenda of the Convention; Rules, Credentials and
Convention Budget. \Vashington Post, Sept. 7, 1967, at· Fl, col. 5.
New Jersey established the following committees: Arrangement and Form; Submission and Address to the People; Rules, Organization, and Business Affairs; and Credentials, Printing, and Authentication of Documents.
Michigan had four operational committees: Style and Drafting; Administration; Public Information; and Rules and Resolutions.
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drafting and arrangement.m It is often convenient to centralize rules policy,
business affairs, and other organizational matters in a special committee.m
Finally, many conventions have had success with a committee which coordinates publicity and general outside contact. 138 The importa nce of these
committees cannot be overemphasized. It is essential to the overall success
of the convention that it be able to function smoothly; it is the refore necessary that capable and interested delegates be placed 011 these committees.
Although they will not be concerned with substantive constitutional issues,
these members perform the important task "of easing and implementing the
process of constitution-making." 139

Committee Membership
A nonpartisan convention would seem more capable of appointing committee chairmen and memb<;rs on the basis of merit than a partisan convention. In both Michigan 140 and New York 141 the dominant pa rty appointed
only party members to committee chairmanships, while in Maryland appointments were made regardless of political affiliation. It is difficult to
match correctly the interests, ability and experience of delegates with the
needs of the various committees. \,Vhen the convention can select chair136 The Michigan convention utilized its commirtee on style and drafti ng at several
stages. Committees concerned with substantive matters referred the proposal to the
committee of the whole. The committee of the whole then reported the proposal to
the style and drafting committee, which in turn reported its draft to the committee
of the whole. There was a second vote by that body and, if the item was accepted,
it was again referred to the style and drafting committee, and this commi ttee again
reported it~ product to the committee of the whole for a final vote. M 1cH1GAS CoNsnTunoNAL U>NVENTION JouRNAL, Res. No. 72, No. 94, l\tarch 7, 1962, at 722 .
137 It is particularly helpful if this committee controls employment practices ar the
convention since this avoids preferential hiring by the delegates themsel n·s. The committee is able to test potential employees ohjectively and employ applicants on the basis
of relative merit. The overall level of the ability of employees is consequently increased. J. POLLACK, MAKING l\1tcH1GAN's N1::w U>NSTITUTION 34-35 (1962) .
138 Michigan found their Committee on Public Information very helpful during
the convention. J. PoLI.AcK, MAKING M1ctnGAN's ~Ew U>NST1TU110N 33 (1962) . The
need to coordinate public information was, perhaps erroneously, appare ntly not considered necessary at the Maryland convention, where one delegate reported that "I a I
SI0,000 tire or an assault and robbery get a helluva Isic] loc more news coverage than we
do." Wall Street Journal, December 6, 1967, at I, col. I.
The Maryland public information committee Wat of the opinion that it was noe
me businc11 of the convention to promote the new corutlrution but th at t his was a
rask for organizations and persons not directly related to the convention. Balrimore
Sun, Dec. 8, 1967, at Al2, col. I.
139 A. Srt:RM, U>NSTITUTioN-MAKING 1N M1c111GAN 80-81 (1963).
140 Id. at 73-77.
tu Note 93 rupra.
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men from only one party, and when the dominant pany insists that the
party ratio at the convention as a whole be reflected by an equivalent ratio in
the various committees, as in Michigan, H 2 the task of selecting responsible
committeemen and ch1innen is all the more difficult.
It is obvious that delegates will be interested in particular committees.
Interests may often depend upon vocation or profession. It is only natural
that attorneys and judges will wish to revise the judiciary, that legislators
will want to serve on the legislative committee, that local government officials will want to sit on the local government committee, and that bankers
and businessmen will be drawn to a finance or taxation committee. To some
extent, vocational backgrounds and interests should control in appointing
delegates to the committees, but caution should be exercized to avoid overloading committees with especially interested members. It is essential th~t the
constitution have a broad appeal and that fresh approaches be taken to old
problems. The judicial system is no more the exclusive domain of the bar
than the legislature is the sole concern of legislators. It is important that
some experienced members be available to point out current problems and
possible solutions, but all citizens are interested in constitutional matters and
all committees should be structured to achieve a roughly equal balance
between members with special interests and those whose interests are more
general.
·

Erterna/ Presrures
The importance of a constitutional convention is of such magnitude that
it is impossible to have it function in a vacuum, free from outside pressures.
Indeed, delegates are elected representatives who should be subject to the
desires of their constituents. But it is necessary to limit external pressures in
some manner in order to assure that delegates concentrate on their task and
are left free from coercive pressures. The basic purpose of a constitutional
convention transcends the purpose of normal partisan political processes.
The decisions of the delegates cannot be repealed by a simple majority
when the passions of the day have passed. Moreover, many delegates may
be inexperienced at sheddit1g lobby pressures. Accordingly, convention
delegates should be insulated to a greater extent than legislators from lobbying activity.
There are innumerable methods of exerting pressure from outside. Political leaders in the state will attempt to influence decisions at the convention
both through the party machinery and through statements made to the
press.H 3 Nonpartisan delegates are of course better able to ignore such
Note 140 mpra.
New York had this experience. Governor Rockefeller objected to m2ny of the
-~amc constitutional proposals that Rcpublic2n delegates disliked. W2shington Post.
142

143
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pressures than partisan delegates who muse cater co the wishes of party
leaders and muse answer co their constituents if they seek elec tion co another
office.
Prolific lobbying c:1ccics ·m:1y impede che internal wor kings of cite convention. Professor Pollack, a delegate at the Michigan convention, noted
that open committee meetings meant char lobbyists and newspaper reporters
were always present. Although he approved of the open meetings, he noted
chat the presence of these groups sometimes made agreement more difficult,
and delegates tended co talk for newspapermen and lobbyists rather than
for other delegates. 144 To regulate lobby pressure, the Michigan convention
required that lobbyists register and keep a record of their expenses for
publicity and entertainment of delegates. These records were open to the
public.m
Maryland experienced lobbying activity but, because the delegates had
few political party ties, these pressures were largely ignored. 146 Despite
the opposition of virtually the entire legislature, the Republican governor,
and Democratic organizations in the Baltimore area, the convention :ipproved a single-member districting proposal by a vote of 83 to 52. Furthermore, after a tie vote rejected a labor bill of rights "labor organizations
began a blitz campaign of personal contact and telegrams.'_' 147 However, the
Sept. 7, 1967, at FIS, cols. 1-7. However, his views were more widely publicized by
the press than those of the delegates.
144 J. Pou.ACK, MAKING l\11cH1GAN's NEw Cossnn:11os 29-3 0 (1962) .
14 ~ MICHIGAN CONVENTION JOURNAL, Res. No. 106, No. 115, ;\lay 9, 1942, at 1280.
148 A. S11.:RM, CoNSTITU110N-i\hK1NG tN ,\1icmcAN IH-35 (1963) describes the lobby
situation in Michigan:
Lobbying methods and tactics at the constitutional convention differed considerably from chose usually employed in the regu lar lawmaking process. In the
first place, far fewer lobbyists registered ar the convention than with the legislature. With a few exceptions, such as the highway interests, there was much less
overt lobbying activity, and, generally, it lacked the luster and excitement that
often characterizes lobbying at the legislature. l\1ajor factors that differentiated
lobbying activiry at the convention from pressure on legislators were: first, the
convention's excellent research sraff greatly reduced delegates' reliance on interest
groups for information; second, the nature of the convention with its diversified
membership made lobbying difficult for representatives of interest groups, who
were personally acquainted with relatively few de legates; third, some tradicion:il
techniques could not be effectively applied to delegates elected for a single
purpose and who would not run for re-election; and fourt h, the strong stand that
the convention took on regulating agents of pressure groups and their acti\'ities
discouraged many from re~istering.
The Maryland com·entiori ltsted amon1 it~ re11istered lobby ists younKSters from
t~ University of Maryland Student Go~·ernment Association, who pushed for a reduction in the voting age, a representative from the City of Baltimore to protect irs
interests, and a minister who stated on the registration form that the subject of his
lobby were "Christian principles." \Vall Street Journal, Dec. 6, 1967, at 10, col. 3.
1'7 \Vash.ington Post, Jan. 4, 1968, at El, col 6.
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independent delegates ignored the pressure and properly decided that labor
relations and rights were better left to the legislature.
TH£ RATJFICAnoN P,.ocESS

The ratification process is an integral and decisive part of constitutional
c~ange. 'Although it was formerly held, pursuant to the most extreme view
of convention authority, that a convention is empowered to declare its document to be the law, 148 the modem view is that no such power exists.m
Nevertheless, the constitutions of twelve states require no ratification of a
proposed constitution, 160 and the remnants of the earlier view still color
modern decision-making; one of the official reasons for the recent selection
of the commission method rather than the convention in Virginia was that
the convention could dispense with popular ratification.m
If the constitution is to be submitted to the electorate for its approval,
the manner in which it is submitted should be calculated to ascertain as
completely and conveniently as possible the public will. 1152 There are several alternatives. The constitution may be submitted in toto; each provision
may be voted on separately; or all controversial provisions not essenti~l to
the constitutional scheme may be submitted separately.
Submission of the constitution in toto is administratively convenient,
necessitating only one election and a simple "yes" or "no" response. However, if the proposed constitution contains a controversial provision, this
procedure may cause the defeat of an otherwise sound document. For example, the voters of New York recently rejected a constitution largely be1'8 E.g. Sproule v. Fredericks, 68 Miss. 898, 11 So. 472 (1892). See generally J.
JAMESON, CoNSTJTUTIONAL CoNVE!',TIONS (1887),
149 /d. See Gaines v. O'Connell, 305 Ky. 397, 204 S.W.2d 425 (1947).
1~0 \Vhite, supra note 27 at 1144-45.
111 1 Jn Taylor v. Commonwealth, 101 Va. 829, 44 S.E. 754 (1903), the Virginia court
held as effective a convention document promulgated in defiance of the legislative limitations. However, the Governor and other state officials had already sworn allegiance
to the constitution. The question was whether the convention had to follow legislative
instructions requiring that the praposed document be submitted to popular vote. The
convention declared the instrument effective without popular ratification, and the coon
upheld the declaration. Accord, Miller. v. Johnson, 92 Ky. 589, 18 S.W. 522 (1892).
For a comprehensive summary of the earlier cases on point, sec 15 L.R.A. 524 (1892).
Apparently, this declarative ratification in Virginia has become firm precedent. \Vhen
under attack by Republicans for calling for a constitutional commission rather than a
convention, Governor Mills E. Godwin of Virginia answered that a convention could ·
proclaim the document effective without submitting it for ratification whereas the
commission documrnt would have to be approved by the people. Evening Star (\Vashington, D.C.), Nm 11, 1967, at 82, cols. 2-3.
162 Sec J. JAMESON, CoNSTITtmONAL CoNVENTIONS SJQ (1887),
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cause of opposition to controversial provisions.m But in situations where
only minor changes have been made in an existing constitution, or where
cstim:ition of the popular will suggests no such comrove rsies, submission
of the entire document may be feasible.
Independent submission of each part of :i proposed constitution will rarely
be advisable for major changes. It is inconvenient, necessic:iting an extremely
long ballot ( or many separ:ite elections) :ind a vast :imount of org:inization.
Moreover, such a method would not produce a well-ordered constitution hut
rather a clutter of unstructured and perhaps inconsistent provisions. Sep:iratc
submission of non-i ntegrated controversial provisions is quite desirable, however, since it reduces the possibility that an otherwise sound constitution will
be defeated at the polls. Moreover, it permits ratification of a new constitution to take place with a minimum of :idministrative inconvenience.
The decision on the manner of submission is usually made at the convention. However, further decisions regarding the mobilization of popular
support for the new document must be made during the post-convention
ratification campaign. No matter how sound the document or how universal the official acclaim, an intense educational effort must be made.
Otherwise the opponents of ratification may be able to rally enough support
to defeat it while the potential proponents remain at home.
It has been suggested that failure to mobilize support was the cause of the
Maryland failure, but it is probable that the cause lies decper.154 Whatever
the method of political ch:inge, the members of the body drafting the constitution must appreciate fully the art of the possible. "It's not just how well
you draw your new laws, but how well you understa nd y our voters when
you go submit them." 165
C. L. W.,

Jr.

163 C. LoBrNCtER, THE PEOPLE'S LAw 340-44 (1909). _See text wp,-a at n otes 94-96.
16• See text ru[ITa at note 118.

156 Lrn:,

May 31, 1968, at 4.
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Organizing the
Cons ti tu tional Convention

JOHN E. BE BOUT
The organization and conduct of a "s uccessful" or
useful ,:onstitutional convention does not simply happen. It requires administrative and political statesmanship, endowed with
foresight, a conviction of the special public importance of the enterprise, and a sense of purpose or direction. Too many conventions
have failed to live up to their high calling because they were organized and conducted much too casually.
Important decisions affecting the organization and conduct of a
convention are made before, some long before, the convention is
called. More of these decisions are written into the New York
Constitution than in those of most other states. These provisi ,.,
need to be examined both because of their bearing on the action
of the organizers an I managers of the forthcoming conven tion and
because some of the1 d should probably be changed for the benefit of
future conventions. A review of the pertinent provisions of the
New York Constitution will also throw light on issues th at in one
form or another must be faced in other states.

I
The size of a convention and the basis of representation are among
the most significant factors conditioning its organization and behavior. The fact that the 1967 convention will have 186 members
was determined basically by the constitutional stipulation that
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there shall be three delegates elected from each senate district plus
fifteen more elected at large. The provision for delegates elected
at large is another significant organizational fact. Only the Missouri Constitution makes a similar prescription.
There is little reason to question the soundness of provisions ·
requiring an absolute majority of the convention for a quorum
and for the final vote on proposals, giving the convention control
over its rules, the selection and compensation of its staff, and the
choice of its own officers, and giving the convention discretion
as to the manner and the time, after a lapse of six weel· of submission of its work to the voters.
A question might be raised about the use of the words "after
the adjournment of the convention" in designating the beginning
of the minimum period of six weeks before the election at which
the proposals are voted on by the people. One reason for this is the
growing belid that a convention and its members have a duty to
explain and, subject to the right of dissent on the part of individual delegates, to espouse their work to the people. While arrangements presumably can be made, as they were by the New Jersey
convention of 1947 and the Michigan convention of 1961, for
continuing staff work to handle public information until election,
there is something to be said for preserving the body itself, in case
official action is needed.
The provision that a convention shall meet the first Tuesday
in April following its election is not necessarily so innocuous as
it may sound. As to the place of meeting, two states in recent
years, New Jersey and Alaska, have chosen to hold their conventions on the campus of the state university. In each case the decision was based on the belief that the campus setting would be
more conducive to the kind of deliberation that was hoped for
than the chambers and corridors of the capitol. There is widespread opinion in both states, an opinion in which I concur, that
the belief was justified by events.
The April meeting date means that there is a period of five
months between election and organization during which the convention has no control over its own destiny. This is one month
longer than the old waiting period between the election of a new
president and his inauguration on March 4. During this period the
convention can do nothing to influence the nature of whatever
0
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,

official preparatory work may be done for it. It seems obvious that
the convention could make better use of its total time and resources if it could organize at a time closer to its election. There
is one other reason why a late fixed date for the first meeting of
any convention is of doubtful propriety; it limits the possible use
of a convention in case of an emergency. It may be argued that
there is no such thing in an American state as an emergency requiring such action, al though Rhode Island and Virginia both
used quickie conventions during the Second World War to facilitate soldier voting. Moreover, a constitution so stuffed with essentially legislative detail as that of New York is subject to more rapid obsolescence than a short, general constitution like that of New
Jersey or Alaska. In a time of rapid change and mounting demands
on government, this could cause a state unable to change its basic
law in much less than two years considerable embarrassment. The
Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Cons titution became effective less than ten months after it was approved by the
Senate. The convention may wish to review the timetable prescribed by the constitution with a view to giving the people of
New York greater flexibility in the use of future conventions.
The members of the New York convention of 1967 will be the
highest paid convention delegates in American history, with annual salaries of $15,000 and $3,000 expense allowances. This is
the result of the constitutional provision equating the pay of delegates with that of legislators. In contrast, Rhode Island today, and
New Jersey in 1947, have allowed only modest expenses. The New
York pay scale is surely high enough to justify expecta tion that
the delegates will make the convention their major business for
any reasonable duration. That it is high enough, as some have
cynically suggested, to tempt them to protract their proceedings
into a second or third year seems doubtful. On the other hand,
should it seem necessary to achieve a good result to continue into
a second year, as in 1he case of the Missouri convention of 194344, the delegates should not hesitate to do so, even though it would
mean another annual salary. Happily, argument over the cost of a
convention has been less a deterrent to investment in foresight in
New York than in most other states. However, the convention may
wish to consider whether the constitutional provision for the compensation of delegates should be modified.
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The New Jersey and Rhode Island no-pay plan certainly is not
to be recommended in any state under modem conditions, unless,
perhaps, for a convention limited by law or common consent to a
very short a1;·· nda and time schedule. For a large state like New
York, where ·'.e agenda is general review and revision of a difficult, complex constitution, it is undoubtedly important to pay
delegates enough to expect them to concentrate on the job for a
considerable period of time.
How much time? The Michigan convention, which had the benefit of substantial background preparation : :id _excellent staff work,
opened October 1, 1961, took just over seven months to complete
its draft adopted on May 11, 1962, and then recessed until August
1, when it made a few changes, mainly for clarification and other
technical reasons, and adjourned sine die. The delegates received
$7,500 each, plus mileage to and from the convention once a
month, for this service.
Delegates to the Michigan convention were able to point to a
number of ways in which its work might have been expedited.
However, the actual timetable does not seem unreasonably long,
given the fact that almost everyone goes into a convention without specific prior experience. Since the Michigan Constitution was
shorter and less complex than that of New York, this state will
do well if it gets a serious, competent job in much less time.
This brings us to the provision in the New York Constitution
which directs the convention delegates to "continue their session
until the business of such session shall have been completed."
Some, observing the dispatch with which the Alaska and New
Jersey conventions, both limited by law to three months, completed their work, and comparing them with the more protracted
proceedings of the recent Michigan convention and the Missouri
convention of 1943-44 and the almost interminable proceedings
of the latest Rhode Island convention, argue for a mandatory deadline. There is no doubt that a deadline has considerable disciplinary value. There were other factors, however, in both Alaska and
New Jersey, that tended to reinforce and make feasible the completion of a sound job within the time allotted.
It seems quite likely that any such deadline would have doomed
the Missouri and Michigan conventions to futility. In either case
success would have required an administrative and political mir-
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acle. Even in Alaska, some observers who felt that the threemonth period was enough to do the basic job believe that the
document could have been approved if the convention, like the
Michigan convention, could have returned briefly, after a period
of staff work over the document, to reconsider matters of style and
a few matters of substance. On balance, it seems best to leave the
duration of the convention to the delegates themselves, although
some states might wish to encourage reasonable dispatch by some
limitation in the pay scheme.

II
As constitutional conventions go, the 1967 body will be a large
one, although not so large as the four hundred-odd-member convention in New Hampshire and the _320-member convention in
Massachusetts in 1917. This fact will impose difficult problems
on the managers and delegates and raises a serious question about
the desirability of changing the constitutional basis for representation in future conventions. Missouri, the only other state with
constitutional provision for delegates-at-large, elects only two instead of three members from each senate district. This rule in New
York would have reduced the forthcoming convention to 129, fifteen less than the 144-member Michigan convention, which
seemed a little too large for ideal committee work and convention
debate. If it is possible to achieve representativeness in a body
of less than one hundred, experience in the smaller conventions
in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, New Jersey, and some other states
suggests that the efficiency of $uch a body as a deliberative assembly is worth reaching for.
Although the delegates-at-large are an unusual feature of the
New York convention and increase its size, experience in both
New York and Missouri points to the desirability of retaining
them. In both states it has proved possible to attract as delegatesat-large elder statesmen and especially qualified persons who
might not have run or been elected as district delegates. It is not
surprising that a disproportionate number of the official and intellectual leaders of conventions in both states have tended to appear among the delegates-at-large. In view of the crucial importance of leadership and experience in a convention, this asset
should be preserved.
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The most importan t factor to be considered in the organization
and conduct of a convention is the nature and scope of its mission.
Some states have in recent years held conventions limited to dealing with certain parts of the constitution. Obviously, such a convention may require less time, less preparation, and less management than one charged with responsibility for general revision.
However, most conventions have been expected to review the
whole constitution and have had a license to propose changes in
any or all parts of the constirution. This is and has always been
the mission of constitutional conventions in New York. The wording of Article XIX, Section 2, clearly precludes the possibility of
legal limitation similar to that which denied the New Jersey convention of 1.947 access to the provisions on legislative representation. Moreover, the generous compensation for delegates would
make little or no sense if the delegates were not expected to concern themselves with the entire document. Finally, the detailed
and interlocking nature of the provisions of various parts of the
New York Constitution makes it impossible to do a sound job of
revision of any fundamental nature without looking at the document as a whole.
This is not to say that specific changes might not well be made
in various provisions without affecting other related provisions.
It is to say, however, that if the constitution is to be treated as an
integral document and if a convention is to produce anything like
a general revision which has internal integrity and consistency,
the convention must organize to deal with the constitution as a
whole as well as with its separate parts. The fact is that its parts
have over the years become more and more complexly intertwined. This is partly the result of piecemeal amendment and
partly a cause of the increasing necessity to submit individual
amendments to the people. One of the principal justifications of
the constitution:il convention is th:it it has a single and comprehensive mandate to take a general look at the constitution as a
whole.
Two additional predetermined conditions not set by the New
York Constitution that are important to the organization and conduct of the convention must be noted. One is the partisan election
of delegates, with all delegates presumably bc:iring primary al-
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legiance to either the Democratic or the Republican party. Certai ,\
implications of this will be discussed later. Suffice it to observe
here that some states forbid party nomination or party labels and
regard partisan election as incompatible with the long-range constituent purpose of a convention.
The second condition is the background preparation already
made or under way. It has long been recognized that the effectiveness of a convention may be greatly affected by the nature and
quality of such preparation. The preparation for the New York
convention of 1915 set a standard for preparatory work that has
been imitated if not always matched by preparation for conventions in many other states. The convention to meet in April will
start with access to background material prepared by The Temporary Commission on the Revision and Simplification of the
Constitution between 1956 and 1961 and with the material now
being prepared by The Temporary Commission on the Constitutional Convention. Unfortunately, as everyone knows, the work
of the latter commission has been delayed and will necessarily be
limited in scope because of a long period of dissension in the commission and the consequent resignation of two staff directors before the present staff was assembled. Under the circumstances, The
Academy of Political Science is especially to be congratulated for
following its own 1914 precedent by devoting these proceedings
to problems of the convention.
In addition, it is to be hoped that those \\ ~;o assume leadership
responsibility for the convention will use the remaining time to
supplement these preparations, especially by making plans to engage the convention with the task not of mere tinkering with constitutional details but of writing what amounts to a new integral
constitution for the Empire State. New York has not had such a
constitution for a good many years.
Without careful planning and expert management, constitutional
tinkering is about all that can be expected. One is tempted to
suggest that the convention should prepare for a job of constitutional slum clearance, for the elimination of the jumble of complex,
outworn, and interpenetrating provisions that make it increasingly
difficult for the government of the day to deal in a straightforward manner with rapidly emerging and changing situations.
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III
There is neither space nor need here to discuss in detail the rules
and the logistics of convention operation. These have all been
critically and sensibly discussed again and again during the last
half century or so. Some of the most useful sources are listed in
the bibliographical note at the end of this paper.
In view of the method of election of dek s ates and the political
tradition of the state, the future of the com·ention lies largely in
:he hands of the party leadership. The parties exist. Only they can
act in advance to inject some order, dispatch, and sense of direction into the early proceedings of the convention. In so doing, it
is to be hoped that they will remember that their job is to write
a constitution for all the people of New York for at least a generation ahead. A statute defeated or marred by excessive partisanship
can be revived or repealed by the next legislature. A constitution
lost or flawed by short-range political considerations cannot be so
easily retrieved.
The record shows that in well run conventions, relatively few
matters raise genuine and legitimate party issues. The parties can
and should compete in the convention for credit in writing a good
constitution that both parties and most of the voters will wish to
support. This was, in fact, the essence of the bipartisan spirit of
the New Jersey convention of 1947. That convention and some
others demonstrate that if the leaders of parties or factions deal
with one another fairly, in terms of their common task and objective, a spirit of community develops among the delegates which
raises the level of their aspiration and performance as they learn
to know one another and to sense the excitement and importance
of their mission. This state of affairs depends heavily on accidents
of personality and position, but the extent to which it is achieved
depends also on the working conditions that result from specific
aspects of convention organization and management.
It must be recognized that the size of the convention intensifies
the difficulty of achieving optimum member involvement and
ddibcration without excessive delays. The size of the body, together with its partisan cleavage, also complicates the problem of
0 rcanizing a representative and eff cctive committee system relatcJ to the srand objective of integral constitutional revision.
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The committee structure may prove to be the principal clue to thl'
nature of the convention's end product and the key test of the devotion of the leadership of both parties to the public interest.
Observers of constitutional conventions generally agree that thl'
number of committees should be kept small, with each substantivl'
committee charged with responsibility for a broad segment of the
constitution and with no member serving on more than one such
committee. The New Jersey convention of 1947 had only five subject-matter committees in addition to the Committee on Arrangement and Form, often known as the Committee on Style. The subject-matter committees were as follows: Rights, Privileges, Amendments and Miscellaneous Provisions; Legislative; Executive, Militia, and Civil Officers; Judici.ary; Taxation and Finance. In addition, there were committees on Submission and Address to the
People; Rules, Organization, and Business Affairs; and Credentials, Printing, and Authentication of Documents. The Michigan
convention of 1961-62 had nine substantive committees and four
others. One of the worst models was set by the New York convention of 1938, which established thirty-four committees, including
committees on such world-shaking matters as Canals and Indian
Affairs and separate committees on Cities, Counties and Towns,
and Villages. A committee structure of this sort is almost guaranteed to increase rather than to diminish the detail and prolixity
in a constitutional document. Its only advantages lie in the fact
that it provides committee chairmanships and vice-chairmanships
for a S\ 111stantial proportion of the delegates and so fractionates the
work , · the delegates that the only possible way to achieve any
kind of acceptable order at the end of the convention is by backroom negotiation among a few leaders. I£ the convention of 1967
were to start out with such a committee structure, some delegate
could perform a great service to the state by introducing a motion
to adjourn sine die immediately.
If the convention is ready to consider writing a basic constitution, it could achieve its purpose with very few substantive committees. Logically, these five committees would be enough: (1) bill
of rights, suffrage and elections, revision and amendment; (2) legislative organization; (J) executive; (4) judiciary; (5) legislative
power. This last committee would be responsible for reviewing
and, hopefully, recommending the elimination or reduction of a
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host of provisions relating to local government, state and local fin:mce, economic regulation, and education and social welfare that
now have the principal effect of limiting legislative power and
cunailin.s the adaptability of the state-local system to changing
conditions. It would doubtless be more realistic to think in terms
of separate committees on local government; finance; economic
n:gulation, conservation, and development; and education and social welfare in place of the committee on legislative power. This
would come to eight substantive committees. ln addition, of
course, there would need to be a committee on style and drafting,
a committee on rules and administration, or separate co11unittees on
each, and a committee on public information. Admit. !dly it will
take considerable political restraint to keep the number of committees so low. Another difficulty lies in the fact that in order to
put every member of the convention on a substantive committee,
an absolute necessity from almost any rational point of view, the
average committee would have to have twenty-three members,
which is a larger number than would be ideal.
The size problem can be mitigated by management. Each of the
major subjects suggested as a basis for committee division can be
divided into aspects upon which different members of the committee may usefully specialize. Moreover, the structure of the present constitution is such that certain clauses will need to have the
:iuention of more than one committee, a fact which points to the
desirability of establishing inter-committee task forces or joint
subcommittees on particular topics. Obviously it would be a great
deal easier to maintain useful communication and perhaps develop
$Orne harmony of views and recommendations with respect to interrelated or overlapping provisions by arrangements among from
two to four committees than by arrangements among a larger number with more limited assignments.
As to the problem of achieving full discussion and open action
on aB crucial matters without permitting the proceedings to bog
Jown, the more fully engaged all members are in significant comnrit1ee work, the less temptation there will be for individual memh~rs to make Brownie points on the floor. With committees of
•1 rproxima.tely twenty-three each, conscientiously selected with a
\'iew to fair representation of a cross-section of the convention,
nurch debate that would otherwise occur on the floor should take
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pl::ice in the committee rooms. This would permit the focu sing of
floor debate on significant issues that had been previously threshed
out and defined by discussion within the committees. The convention should certainly avoid the error made in the current Rhode
Island convention of requiring a convention vote on every proposal
submitted by a member. Committees should have freedom to amalgamate, reconcile, or reject individual proposals, reserving the
right of petition, signed by a reasonable but relatively small number of members, to force out a question for convention action.

IV
Experience in a number of conventions, including those in Alaska, New Jersey, and Michigan, all point to the need for a strong
staff with varied specialists to work intensively with the committees. Members of this staff should be chosen under the authority of the convention in such m:mner as to insure that they are
acceptable to the committees that they serve.
One special caution should be observed in the selection of certain committees. The convention should avoid loading a committee
with a particular kind of expertise supposedly related to the subject-matter of the committee. Competent observers have suggested
that the committee ~ on the judiciary in the Alaska and Michigan
conventions might ;1.ive been more effective if they had not both
been overloaded with lawyers. In like manner, a committee on
finance should not be overloaded with bankers, accountants, or
finance officers.
The committee on style and drafting should organize and start
work as early as any other committee. It shou!,1 begin to develop,
hopefully on the basis of preparatory work completed before the
convention assembles, some suggestions regarding form and style,
and with its technical staff should be available to subject-matter
committees at all times. The committee on style and drafting,
moreover, if it is kept abreast of draft proposals from other committees, can serve as a communication link between the committees whose subject-matter areas impinge upon each other. While
a committee on style and drafting should not have authority to
make changes in substance, it should call attention to substantive
inconsistencies between differen t parts of the document and should
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not hesitate to raise any substantive matter which it deems potentially inconsistent with the general tenor of the convention's
work. Either the committee on style and drafting or an ad hoc committee near the end of the convention, perhaps a committee which
would include chairmen of the other committees, should audit the
document, before it is finally approved, for substance as well as for
style, with a view to raising for one more possible review any issues that it feels may have been, for some reason, inadequately
considered.
One of the most importan1 : nd sensitive tasks will be that of
the committee on public information. Like the committee on style
and drafting, this committee should start work at once and see to
it that the public is constantly and adequately informed of the
progress of the convention, making use of all media and maintaining contact with all citizen and official groups that display an
interest in the convention. It should, in consultation with the other
committees, develop a strategy for the use of public hearings
and for inviting suggestions for change or comment on tentative
proposals from ir ·· vidual citizens or citizen organizations.
This committee should continue in active business until the
election on the convention's proposals. It should be responsible
for preparing and disseminating not only the text of the new constitution or amendments, but also an explanatory report to the
people setting forth the reasoning behind and the significance of
the changes to be voted on. Among the better models for such
statements are those prepared by the Missouri, New Jersey, Alaska,
and Michigan conventions. The committee should also provide information by way of all the available media. Finally, it should
assist the individual members of the convention in the discharge
of their duty to give the people an accounting of their stewardship
by helping the voters make an informed decision.

Bibliograpliicnl Note
One of the best short statements on the organization, procedure, and conduct
of a convention was made by Walter F. Dodd : "The Constitutional Convention:
Preliminary Work, Procedure and Submission of Conclusions" in "The Revision
of the State Constitution," Proceedings of the Academy of Politicnl Science. V
(1914), 54-72. A good practical manual prepared for the recent Michigan constitutional convention by William J. Pierce, professor of law, University of
Michigan, was issued by the Constitutional Convention Preparatory Cornmis-
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sion, September 1961, under the title "Michigan Constitutional Convention
Studies." This includes a complete set of suggested rules with comments. See
also: Albert L. Sturm, Constitution-Making in Micl1igan 1961-1962 (Ann Arbor,
1963); James K. Pollock, Making Michigan's New Constitution 1961-1962 (Ann
Arbor, 1962); Theodore R. Ervin, Crosscurrents of Influence in tl1e Committee
on Legislative Organization in Michigan's Constitutional Co11ve11tion (East
Lansing, 1964); Albert L. Sturm and James B. Craig Jr., "State Constitutional
Conventions: 1950-1965,'' State Government, XXXIX (1.966), 67-85; The Constitutional Convention, A .Manual on Its Planning, Organization n11d Operation,
prepared by John P. Wheeler Jr. (National Municipal League, New York, 1961);
and John E. Bebout and Emil J. Sady, "Staging a Constitutional Convention,''
Chap. V in W. Brooke Graves (ed.), Slate Constitutional Revision (Public Administration Service, Chicago, 1960).
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CHAPTER III
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
By Albert L. Sturm

Reprinted by permission of author and publisher from: Albert
L. Sturm.
"Constitutional Conventions." Chapter 4 and
Epilogue in Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making: 19381968, pp. 51-80 and 112-116. New York; National Municipal
League, 19 70 ..

Constitutional Conventions
Traditionally, American states have employed the constitutional
convention for extensive revision of an old constitution or the writing of
a new one. Although this method has been used primarily for major
changes, in recent years some conventions have proposed more limited
modifications in the form of one or more amendments when other methods were unauthorized or inexpedient. Indigenous to the United States,
constitutional conventions are expressly authorized in the basic laws of
approximately four-fifths of the states and the commonwealth of Puerto
Rico ( see Table 4 and Appendix C). In the remaining states, judicial
interpretation and practice have established this method extraconstitutionally.15 Since the formation of th~ Union, at least 218 constitutional
conventions had been held in the United States through 1968.
UsE OF CoNSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS

An Overview through 1968
Table 9, below, lists the numbers and dates of constitutional convenAlbert L. Sturm, Methods of State Constitutional Reform (Michigan Governmental Studies No. 28; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1954),
chap. v. For example, Louisiana, whose constitution contains no provision for
a constitutional convention, has held 10 such constituent assemblies. Similarly,
Arkansas and Mississippi have called six and seven constitutional conventions,
respectively, without express constitutional provision.
15

-54-

tions held in the 50 statc•s and Pnl'rto Hico, as of January I, 1969. ( Authorities differ in their dekrmination of the number of constitutional
con\'entions held in the states. Some include constitutional commissions,
and some count the instances in which the legislature has served as a
convention. In compiling the data for Table 9, information provided by
state officials and leading authorities on the constitution in the respective
states has been used. Constitutional commissions and instan-ces in which
legislatures have acted as conventions are excluded.) New Hampshire
with 15 ( until 1964 the convention was the only authorized method for
constitutional alteration in New Hampshire, with required submission of
the convention question to the voters every seven years), Georgia with
12, Vermont with 11 and Louisiana with 10 lead all other states in the
numbers of conventions. New York and Virginia each have called nine
such assemblies, and three states-Mississippi, Missouri, and New Mexico-have convened seven each. Six states have held six conventions
each (Alabama, Arkansas, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee and·
Texas), and seven states have assembled five of these constituent bodies
TABLE

9

NUMBER AND DAn:s OF CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONS

As of January 1, 1969
State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
C:ilifomia
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
lllinois
Indiana
low.i

Kansas
l.'.t·ntucl-y

Total Number
6
l
l

6
2

1
3
5
5

12
2

1
5

i

3

~

•l

Date.,

1819,1861,1865,1867,1875,1901
1955-56
1910
1836, 1861,1864,1868,1874,1917-18
1849, 1878-79
1875-76
1818, 1902, 1965
1776,1792, 1831,1853,1897
1838-39, 1861, 1865,1868, 1885
1777, 1788, 1789 {2 in 1789), 1795, 1798, 1833,
1839, 1861, 1865,1868, 1877
1950, 1968
1889
1818,1847, 1862, 1869-70, 1920-22
1815, 1850-51
18-H , 1846, 1857
1855, 1857, 1858, 1859
170:2, 1794, 1849-50, 1890-91
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TABLE

State

Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

Total Number

10
1

5
4
5
1
7
7
3
3
2

15

New Jersey

3

New Mexico
New York

7
9

North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

6

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont

9 {Continued)

1
4
I
I
5
6
5

3
6
6

l
11

Virginia

9

Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Puerto Rico

2
2

2
1
1

Dates

1812,1845, 1852,1861,1864, 1868,1879, 1898,
1913,1921
1819
1776, 1850-51, 1864, 1867,1967-68
1779-80, 1820, 1853, 1917-19
1835, 1850, 1867, 1907-08,1961-62
1857
1817,1832, 1851, 1861, 1865, 1868,1890
1820, 1845-46, 1861-63, 1865, 1875, 1922-23,
1943-44
1866, 1884,1889
1871, 1875, 1919-20
1863,1864
1776, 1778-79, 1781-83, 1791-92, 1850-51, 1876,
1889, 1902, 1912, 1918-23, 1930, 1938-41,1948,
1956-59, 1964
1844, 1947, 1966 ( 1944 legislature acted as convention}
1848, 1849, 1850, 1872, 1889-90, 1907, 1910
1776-77, 1801, 1821, 1846, 1867, 1894, 1915,
1938,1967
1776, 1835,1861-62,1865-66,1868,1875
1889
1802, 1850-51,1873,1912
1906-07
1857
1776, 1789-90, 1837-38, 1872-73, 1967-68
1842, 1944, 1951, 1955, 1958, 1964-69
1790, 1861, 1865,1868,1895
1883, 1885, 1889
1796, 1834, 1870, 1953, 1959, 1965
1836, 1845, 1861, 1866,1868-69, 1876
1895
1777, 1786, 1793, 1814, 1822, 1828,1836,1843,
1850, 1857, 1870
1776, 1829-30, 1850-51, 1861, 1864, 1867-68,
1901-02, 1945, 1956
1878, 1889
1861-63,1872
1846, 1847-1 l
1889
1951-52
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(Deleware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania and
South Carolina) . Four such assemblies have convened in each of four
states ( Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts and Ohio-in addition, nine
conventions were held in Kentucky prior to statehood). SLx states have
called three conventions ( Connecticut, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey and South Dakota), seven states have held two each (California,
Hawaii, Indiana, Nevada, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin),
and 11 states and Puerto Rico have had only one such assembly ( Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Utah and Wyoming). The conventions in those states in which
only one has been held formulated the original constitution that still
serves as the basic instrument of government.
Table 10 shows the number of constitutional conventions held during
each quarter-century period from 1800 through 1950, those convened
before 1801, and the number held from 1950 through 1968. Almost a
third of the total were called during the period 1851-1875, which includes
the Civil War and Reconstruction years. Approximately three-fifths of the
conventions convened during this period are attributable to the northsouth conflict, its prelude and aftermath.
TABLE

UsE

10

OF CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVENTIONs
GROUPED

PruuomCALLY
Number of
Conventions

Period

26

Before 1801
1801-1825
1826-1850
1851-1875
1876-1900
1901-1925
1926-1950
1951-1968

14
38

61
25

20
9
19°
218

Total
0

Including the 1951-52 convention in Puerto Rico .

Compared with the number of conventions assembled during each
of the two preceding l 1lf-ccnturies, the first 50 years of the twentieth
century witnessed subs .1ntially fewer such bodies. The figures for each
successive 50-year period are as follows: 1801-1850, 52 conventions; 18511900, 92 conventions; ai,J 1901-1950, 29 conventions. In contrast with the
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relatively small amount of activity during the first half of the twentieth
century, American states showed increasing interest in constitutional reform during the following 18 years. This recent burgeoning concern is
especially evident if those conventions assembled precedent to statehood
and others attributable to the political disruption of the Civil War and
Reconstruction era are disregarded in long-range comparisons.
Increasing use of other methods of constitutional change, as explained
in the two preceding chapters, affords additional evidence of the growing
recognition in American states of the necessity for modernizing the legal
foundations of their governments.

Constitutional Conventions, 1938-1968
This chapter focuses attention on the use of constitutional conventions
during the 31-year period 1938-1968, inclusive, and particularly since
midcentury. Table 11 includes data on 27 constitutional conventions assembled in that period. These bodies were convened in 14 jurisdictions,
including 12 existing states, to modify their constitutions or to write new
ones, and in three territories to prepare new instruments of government.
(The 12 existing states included Hawaii, which also held a convention
in 1968 to propose extensive revision of the document written by the
1950 convention before statehood.) In Hawaii ( 1950) and Alaska ( 19551956) new basic laws were formulated in anticipation of statehood, and
Puerto Rico ( 1951-1952) wrote a new charter as the basis for commonwealth status. Of the 27 conventions, eight convened between 1938 and
1950, and 19 were held in the 18 years after midcentury. Significantly,
in the latter period the number of constitutional conventions has averaged
more than one a year. (The average is higher if 1969 is added. Three
constitutional conventions were held this year-in Arkansas, New Mexico
and Illinois.)
Limitations of this study preclude detailed analysis of even the procedural aspects of constitution-making by convention since 1938. 18 The
For an analysis of political as well as procedural aspects of recent state
constih1tional conventions, see Albert L. Sturm, Constitution-Making in Michigan, 1961-1962 ( Michigan Governmental Studies No. 43; Ann Arbor: Institute
of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1963); Albert L. Sturm
and Margaret Whitaker, lmplcme11ting A New Co11stitutio11: The Michigan Experience (Michigan Governmental Studies No. 50; Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1968); Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. and
Jay S. Goodman, The Politics of the Rh, ·e Island Co11stiti1tio11al Conve11tio11
(New York: National 1fonicipal League, i )69); and other forthcoming State
Constitutional Convention Studies to be published by the National Municipal
League.
18
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TABLE 11
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
1938- 1968
Referendum
on Convention
Queuion

O,nvention
Dates

Type
of
O,nvention

Alaska

Nov. 6, 1955•
Feb.6, 1956

Unlimited

None

Alaska
Statehood
Committee

$300,000

55

New con•
stitution

April 24, 1956:
constitution
adopted. Vote:
17,477
7,180a

Connecticut

July l·
Oct. 28, 1965

Unlimited

Noneb

Constitutional
Convention
Commission

$500,000

84

New constitution

Dec. 14, 1965 :
constitution
adopted .
Vote: 178,432
84,129

Hawaii

1. Apr. 4-

Unlimited

None

State
Constitution
Commission

$655,000

63

New constitution

Nov. 7, 1950:
constitution
adopted.
Vote: 82,788
27,109

2. July 15·
Unlimited
Oct. 21, 1968

Nov. 8, 1966
Vote: 119,097
62,120

Legislative
Reference
Bureau

$1,680,000
($875,000
expended)

82

23 amendments (revised con•
stitution)

Nov. 5, 1968: 23
proposals submitted; 22 adopted

Maryland

July 11, 1967; Unlimited
Sept. 12, 1967Jan. l 0, 1968

Sept. 13, 1966
Vote: 160,280
31,680

Constitutional
Convention
Commission

$1,230,000
(plus $750,000
for referendum)

142

New con•
stitution

May 14, 1968: con•
stitution rejected.
Vote: 284,033
367 ,101

Michigan

Oct. 3, 1961May 11, 1962,
Aug. 1, 1962

Apr. 3, 1961
Vote: 596,433
573,012

Constitutional
Convention
Preparatory
Commission

$2,000,000

144

New constitution

April 1, 1963: con•
stitution ad ted.
Vote: 810,8 0
803,436

State

Preparatory
Body

Appropriation

Number of
Convention Convention
Delegates Proposal(s)

I
V,

Referendum
on Convention
Proposal(1)

\D

I

July 22, 1950

Unlimited

aFor all referenda the rust figure gives the favorable vole; the second, the opposing vole.
bA.. ,oee:\al f~d~r:1.\ c:ourl ordcted the \e>&l&latur~ to call the convention.
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TABLE 11 (Continued)

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
1938-1968
State

Missouri

Convention
Dates

Type of
Convention

Referendum
on Convention
Question

Preparatory
Body

-Appropriation

Nov. 3, 1942
Vote: 366,018
265,294

Faculty group
at University
of Missouri

Sense of people
taken in annual
town meetings
in 1937

None

2. 12 days
Unlimited
between May
12 and June
4, 1948

Nov. 5, 1946
Vote: 49,230
29,336

None

$60,000

3. May 15-June Unlimited
13, 1956,
Dec. 2-4,
1959

Nov. 2, 1954
Vote: 64,813
37,497C

None

$75,0ood

Sept. 21, 1943- Unlimited
Sept. 29, 1944

$916,875

Numb er of
Convention Convention
Delegates Proposal(s/

Referendum
on Convention
Proposal(s)

83

New constitution

Feb. 27, 1945:
constitution
adopted.
Vote: 312,032
185,658

481 (1938)
451 (1941)

4 amendments in
1938
3 amendments in
1941

Nov. 8, 1938: 4
amendments submitted; 1 adopted.
Nov. 3,1942: 3
amendments submitted; 3 adopted.

llamendments

Nov. 2, 1948: 6
amendments submitted; l adopted.
Nov. 7, 1950: 5
amendments submilted; 2 adopted.

6 amendments in
1956
3 amendments in
1959

Nov. 6, 1956: 3
amendments submitted and
adopted.
Nov. 4, 1958: 3
amendments submilted and
adopted.
Nov. 8, 1960: 3
amendments submitted and
adopted.

'
New Hampshire l. 11 days
Unlimiteci
between May
11 and June
1, 1938;
Sept. 23-26,
1941
I
(j'\

0

I

I

$25,000 (1938);
$26,244 (1939);
$12,000 (1941)

'

446

447 (1956)
420 (1959)

C"fhe 1956 convention was reconvened in 1959 by a letter from the president to the delegates.
d1t wai not until 1961 that the legislature appropriated an additional $15,000 to pay the staff for work done during the 1959 session.

TABLE I 1 (Continued)
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
1938-1968
State

Convention
Dates

Type of
Convention

Refenndum
on Convention
Question

Preparatory
Body

Pennsylvania

Dec. 1, 1967Feb.29, 1968

Limited

May 16, 1967
Vote: 1,140,931
703,576

Preparatory
Committee

Rhode Island

1. March 28,

limited

March 14, 1944
Vote: 15,683
524

~- June 1-3,
1951

Umlted

3. June 20,
1955
4. Jan. 31,
and Feb. 7,
1958

5 proposals April 23, 1968: 5
proposals sul>mitted and
adopted.

None

$25,000

200

1 amend·
ment

April 11, 1944:
amendment
adopted.
Vote: 7,122
119

May 25, 1951
Vote: 16,738
4,209

None

$25,000

200

8 amend•
ments

June 28, 1951 : 8
amendments submitted; 6 adopted.

Limited

June 9, 1955
Vote: 24,077
20,120

None

$25,000

200

3 amendments

July 12, 1955 : 3
amendments submitted; l adopted.

Limited

Jan. 22, 1958
Vote: 12,476
1,903

None

$50,000

200

2 amend•
ments

Feb. 27, 1958: 2
amendments submitted; 2 adopted.

Nov. 3, 1964
Vote: 158,241
70,975

None

$224,000
($179,182
expended)

100

New con•
stitution

April 16, 1968:
constitution rerejected.
Vote: 17,464
68,940

Aug. 7, 1952
Vote: 196,376
106,583

Ad hoc group
of political
scientists from

Not fixed (Delegates
allowed legislators'
pay and expenses)

99

8 amendments

Nov. 3, 1953: 8
amendments sul>milted; 8 adopted.

5. Dec. 8,
Unlimited
1964-Feb. 17,
1969

Tennessee

1. Apr. 21·

June S, 1953,
July 14·16,
1953

Referendum
on Convention
Proposal(s)

163

I
I-'
I

Number of
Convention Convention
Proposal(s)
Delegates

Budget for Conv:
$1,560,000
(Approx. $200,000
not used)

1944

Q'\

Appropriation

limited

st.ate colleges
~ ~.tve•&lt'-

-•-a---•

-

TABLE 11 {Conti:l'Jed)
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
1938-1968
State

Tenne55ee

Convention

Dates

2. July 21-31,

Ty~of
Convention

I

Virginia

tv
I

Puerto Rico

Preparatory
Body

Appropriation

Numberof Convention
Con•ention Propo:sal{s)
Delegates

Referendum
on Convention
Propo:sal{s)

Limited

Aug. 8, 1958
Vote: 129,554
114,998

None

Same as 1953

99

1 amendment

Nov. 8, 1960:
amendment submitted and
adopted.

3. July 26Aug. 26,
1965, Nov.
29-Dec. 10,
1965

Limited

Nov. 6, 1962
Vote: 216,977
206,390

Legislative
Council
Committee

Same as 1953 and
1959

99

9 amendments

Nov. 8, 1966: 9
amendments submitted; 9 adopted.

1. April 30May 2, 22,
1945

Limited

Ma:rch 6, 1945

None

"a rum sufficient"
($60,037 including
$49,373 election
costs)

40

1 proposal

May 2, 1945: proposal proclaimed
by convention

2. Mar. 5-7,
1956

Limited

Jan.9, 1956
Vote: 304,154
146,164

None

"a sum sufficient"
($93,804, including
$83,366 election
costs)

40

1 amendment

March 7, 1956:
amendment proclaimed by convention

June 4, 1951
Vote: 387,016
119,164

Ad hoc group
organized by
Director of
School of Pub.
Admin. at
University of
P.R.

$250,000

92

New constitution

March 3, 1952:
constitution
adopted.
Vote: 373,594
82,877

1959

CTI

Referendum
on Convention
Question

Vote: 54.515
30,341

Sept. 17, 1951- Unlimited

Feb.6, 1952

TABLE 11 (Continued)
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
1938-1968
State

Convention
Dates

New Hampshire 4. May 14-June
10, 1964,
July 7, 8,
1964

New Jersey

Type of
Convention

Referendum
on Com•ention
Question

w
I

New York

Appropriation

Number of
Convention Convention
Proposal(s)
Delegates

Referendttm
on Convention
Proposal(s)

Unlimited

Nov. 6, 1962
Vote: 94,597
49,418

Commission to
Study the State
Constitution

$100,000

462

21 amendments

Nov'. 3, 1964: 8
amendments submilted; 5 adopted.
Nov. 8, 1966: 7
amendments submilted; 6 adopted.
Nov. 5, 1968: 6
amendments submilted; 5 adopted.

l. June 12Sept. 10,
1947

Limited

June 3, 1947
Vote: 275,209
53,280

Governor's
Committee on
Preparatory
Research

$350,000
(plus $125,000
for election costs)

81

New constitution

Nov. 3, 194 7: constitution adopted.
Vote: 653 ,096
184,63 2

2. March 21June 15,
1966

Limited

None

Law Revision
and Legislative Service
Commission

$250,000

126 delegates (l 12
votes)

l. April 5Aug. 25,
1938

Unlimited

Nov. 3, 1936
Vote: 1,413,604
1,190,275

New York
State Constitutional
Committee

$1,350,000

168

9 amendments

Nov. 8, 1938: 9
amendments submilted; 6 ad opted.

2. April 4Sept. 26,
1967

Unlimited

Nov. 2, 1965
Vote: 1,681,438
1,486,431

Temporary
State Commission on
Revision and
Simplification
of the Constitution and to
Prepare for a
Constitutional
Convention

$10,000,000
($6,477,000
expended)

186

New constitution

Nov. 7, 1967: new
constitution rejected.
Vote: 1,309,877
3,364,630

I
O"I

Preparatory
Body

l reappor- Nov. 8, 1966:
amendmen t
tionment
amendment adopted.
Vote: 890,'/ IO
506,884

factual data on the features of constituent assemblies provided in Table
11 and other significant aspects of these bodies and their work arc summarized and analyzed in the remainder of this chapter.
CAUSES AND A"ITITUDES

The first chapter identifies many state constitutional deficiencies that
have contributed to the calling of constitutional conventions in recent
years. Among the most prominent of these in the older states is legislative
reapportionment to conform to the "one man, one vote" rule. This was
the principal reason for calling conventions in Rhode Island in 1964,
Connecticut and Tennessee in 1965, New Jersey in 1966, New York in
1967 and Hawaii in 1968. Reapportionment was also one of several factors that led to the 1951 Rhode Island constituent assembly, and to conventions in New Hampshire, .r-.lichigan and other states. After judicial
intervention made state legislative reapportionment inevitable, a principal stumbling block to calling constitutional conventions was remo\·ed,
namely, the reluctance of legislative bodies to take the necessary action.
For many decades legislatures had frustrated efforts to call conventions
because they feared that these bodies would include reapp~rtionment in
their proposals for change, thereby jeopardizing the existing advantage of
rural interests in the legislative power structure.
Besides reapportionment and the growing pressure for general constitutional reform, in the older states other factors stemming from p.1rticular
needs and weaknesses in their constitutional systems contributed to convention calls. Two illustrations were the cumbersome amending process
in Virginia, necessitating convePtions in 19-45 and 1956 to expedite alterations, and a fiscal crisis in Michigan. Pressures in various states for
municipal and county home rule, improvements in the legislative process
and judicial reform were among the prominent issues that accounted for
calling most conventions.

Official and Private Attitudes
The calling of any constitutional convention connotes support by both
official and private organizations. Strong and aggressive leadership by
state officials, civic leaders and groups is precedent to practically all
such assemblies. Prominent roles in calling a constitutional convention
are usually played by governors, legislative assemblies, political parties,
the press, "good government" organizations and occasionally the judiciary.
With very few exceptions governors have advocated calling constitu-
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tional conventions in those jurisdictions where this method has been
used.IT Either they have provided strong support for convention calls initially, or have endorsed them publicly after the voters had approved
the calls. Tennessee Governor Frank G. Clement's neutrality toward the
1959 convention, however, is a noteworthy exception. Governors George
M. 'Leader, \Vjlliam W. Scranton and Raymond P. Shafer exemplify the
vigorous bipartisan gubernatorial leadership that led ultimately to the
1967-1968 convention in Pennsylvania. The same type of leadership
featured the long effort in New Jersey, culminating in the 1947 convention during the administration of Governor Alfred E. Driscoll. Initially,
Michigan Governor John B. Swainson and Connecticut Governor John
Dempsey were neutral, but both later supported convention calls.
Compared with the strong advocacy of constitutional conventions by
governors, the attitudes of legislatures have been less favorable, ranging
from active political and financial support through perfunctory provision
for popt•lar referenda on the question to outright hostility. Because of
the crucial role of state lawmaking bodies in the whole process of altering constitutions, legislative attitudes have been particularly significant in
efforts to modernize state government. Generally, legislative assemblies
have tended to be more favorable toward limited constitutional conventions, since they can be controlled more easily than the unlimited conventions. Legislative support for limited conventions in Rhode Island,
Virginia and Tennessee js typical. Territorial legislatures have also provided ample support for preparatory work and financing conventions.
Exemplifying legislative hostility toward unlimited constitutional conventions was the refusal of the Michigan legislature to finance preparations for the 1961-1962 convention, and its hesitancy to provide for the
salaries of delegates and other convention expenses.
Political parties have shown mixed attitudes toward constitutional
conventions. Most successful efforts have had bipartisan support. Unless
revision directly involves sensitive state political issues, constitutional
reform efforts and their opposition usually cut across party lines. The
recent conventions in Michigan and New York afford notable examples of
partisan stands on reform proposals. As the 1961-1962 Michigan convention progressed, opposition to the emerging new document grew among
Democrats and resulted in their proposing a substitute draft. The New
York convention of 1967 was featured by partisanship throughout much
For annual summaries of the contents of governors' messages pertaining
to constitutional reform and other subjects, see the various spring issues of
State Gotiemment.
11
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of its proceedings, and there was sharp partisan division between Democrats (supporting) and Republicans (opposing) in the final vote on its
document. In Connecticut, both parties initially opposed constitutional
revision because of their fear of the results of legislative reapportionment.
But, when reapportionment was removed as a political issue and a judicial order directed the legislators to call a convention, both major parties
favored an unlimited convention, although a small right-\ving Republican
group continued to oppose constitutional revision.
The press has usually supported constitutional conventions called for
purposes of basic legal reform, although some newspapers have opposed
constitutional change. In 1964 the Rhode Island press strongly endorsed
the call of an unlimited convention, but later was critical when it became
apparent that major reforms stood little chance of adoption. Similarly, in
New York the press generally supported initial efforts leading to the
1967 convention, but many of the large metropolitan newspapers opposed
the proposed document, most notably the New York Times. In Tennessee
in 1953 the press was practically unanimous in supporting constitutional
reform by the convention method; but in 1959 and 1965 the urban press
opposed rurally dominated conventions. The prosegregation limited convention of 1956 in Virginia was opposed by the Norfolk Virginia-Pilot and
the Norfolk Ledger Dispatch, but it was favored by most other state
newspapers, especially the Richmond Times-Dispatch, commonly regarded as the voice of the Byrd machine. States in which recent reform efforts
by the convention method have had substantial press support include
Michigan, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Hawaii and others.
Of the numerous citizens' groups that have supported constitutional
revision, the most active in most jurisdictions have been the Leagues of
Women Voters. They have initiated campaigns for convention calls,
worked for the adoption of reforms proposed by conventions and otherwise sought to promote state constitutional modernization. In several
states they instituted litigation that resulted in conventions ordered by
the courts. ( For example, Butterworth v. DempsetJ, 229 F. Supp. 754
D.C. Conn., 1964.) In most states that have held unlimited conventions
in recent years ad hoc citizens· organizations were formed, both to campaign for a favorable vote on convention calls and to work for adoption
of proposed reforms. Illustrative of these were Citizens for Michigan, the
Committee for State Constitutional Revision (Pennsylvania), the Penns_vk111i;i B.1r Association's "Project Constitution," A ~fodern Constitution
f,)r l',·11myk.rnia, Inc., and. in :\farybnd, Governor J. :\fiU:ird Tawes'
C1ti, .. m· Com111iltt"t' m1 tlil' Co11stit11tional Co11vcntio11 Rt'frrcnclum. Bar
-l" 1 ''<-U'1ucl,. the J~_H'IT''1, 11111nk:p.d l1·.1g111·s. l.ihor org.111iLJtio11s :rnd other
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groups, especially including those that expected to benefit from specific
ronstitutional changes, participated in campaigns for conventions.
Croups opposing these assemblies usually have been those that expected
their interests to be adversely affected by proposed constitutional
changes. Jn Alaska and Hawaii, for example, absentee and local business
interests opposed statehood ( and a constitutional convention) because. of
taxation. Rural and small-town interests . in Connecticut opposed a convention because they feared the loss of representational advantages they
had long enjoyed under the old legislative apportionment formula. In
Michigan, constitutional revision by convention was opposed by rural
interests, road builders, some bankers' and manufacturers' associations,
affiliates of the AFL-CIO, the Michigan Farm Bureau, and rural and local
officials' associations. Opposing the Virginia limited convention in 1956
called to amend the constitution to preserve segregation in the schools
were the NAACP, the Virginia Council on Human Relations, the Virginia
Teachers' Association, the Virginia League of Women Voters and other
groups.
CONVENTION CALLS AND AUTHORITY

The constitutional procedure for calling a convention in most states requires the submission of the question to the voters before enactment of
enabling legislation. Of the 27 conventions assembled during the 31-year
period 1938-1968 on which Table 11 provides information, 23 had the
advance approval of the electorate. The four conventions assembled without the expressed mandate of the voters included two in Hawaii and
Alaska convened before statehood and two resulting from court orders
relating to legislative apportionment.
Table 12 shows the results of the votes on convention call referenda
during the 19 years from January 1, 1950 to January 1, 1969. ( On November 5, 1968, the voters of Massachusetts approved an initiative proposal
providing for a vote on the convention question in 1970.) Thirty-three ·
referenda on the convention question were held in 19 states and Puerto
Rico during these years. The voters approved 21 calls in 13 states and
Puerto Rico, and rejected 12 calls in 10 states. Distinguishing between unlimited and Jimited convention calls, there were 23 referenda in 16 states
and Puerto Rico on the question of an unlimited constitutional convention,
and 10 in five states on a limited convention. Results of voter action on
unlimited conventions were 12 approvals in nine states and Pu_erto Rico
and 11 rejections in nine states. Six states each voted on the issue twice
(Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York and Pennsyl-
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TABLE

12

VOTER AcnoN ON CONVENTION CALLS

January 1, 1950-January 1, 1969
State

Date of Election

Type

Arkansas

November 5, 1968 Unlimited

Hawaii

November 8, 1966 Unlimited

Illinois

November 5, 1968 Unlimited

Iowa

(1) November 7, 1950 Unlimited

(2) November 8, 1960 Unlimited
Kentucky

November 8, 1960 Limited

Louisiana

November 6, 1956 Unlimited

Maryland

(1) November 7, 1950 Unlimited
(2) September 13, 1966 Unlimited

Michigan

(1) November 4, 1958 Unlimited
(2) April 3, 1961

Missouri
New Hampshire

Unlimited

November 6, 1962 Unlimited
(1) November 2, 1954 Unlimited
(2) November 6, 1962 Unlimited

New Mexico
New York

November 5, 1968 Unlimited
(1) November 5, 1957 Unlimited
(2) November 2, 1965 Unlimited

Resu'lt
Approved:
227,429 to 214,432
A&proved:
119,0 7 to 62,120
Approved:
2,979,977 to 1,135,440
Defeated:
221,189 to 319,704
Defeated:
470,257 to 534,628
Defeated:
342,501 to 324,777
Defeated:
50,888 to 298,469
Approved:
200,439 to 56,998•
Approved:
160,280 to 31,680
Defeated:
821,282 to 608,3651>
Approved:
596,433 to 573,012
Defeated:
295,972 to 519,499
Approved:
64,813 to 37,497
Approved:
94,597 to 49,418
Approved:
78,353 to 35,854
Defeated:
1,242,568 to 1,368,063
Approved:
1,681,438 to 1,486,431

• Bill providing for convention was defeated in the House of Delegates.
"Total vote cast on proposal: 1,429,647. Total vote cast in election:
2.3-H,829. Proposal failed because it was not approved by a majority of
those voting in the election.
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TABLE 12 (Continued)

5tate
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

Tennessee

Date of Ekctwn

Type

Result

November 4, 1952 Unlimited

Defeated:
853,614 to 1,056,855
Defeated:
November 7, 1950 Unlimited
159,908 to 347,143
( 1) November 3, 1953 Unlimited
Defeated:
533,380 to 682,823
(2) November 5, 1963 Unlimited
Defeated:
1,106,388 to 1,148,060
Approved:
(3) May 16, 1967
Limited
1,140,931 to 703,576
(1) May 25, 1951
Limited
Approved:
16,738 to 4,209
Approved:
(2) June 9, 1955
Limited
24,077 to 20,120
Approved:
( 3) January 22, 1958 Limited
12,476 to 1,903
(4) November 3, 1964 Unlimited
Approved:
158,241 to 70,975
(1) August 7, 1952

Limited

Approved:
196,376 to 106,583
(2) August 8, 1958
Limited
Approved:
129,554 to 114,998
(3) November 6, 1962 Limited
Approved:
216,977 to 206,390
(4) November 5, 1968 Limited
Five subjects were
posed; only the
·
was approved:
422,812 to 301,863•
November 8, 1966 Unlimited
Defeated:
42,638 to 237,461
Limited
Approved:
January 9, 1956
304,154 to 146,164
June 4, 1951
Unlimited
Approved:
387,016 to 119,164

Jw

Utah
Virginia
Puerto Rico

• The respective votes on the four other proposed subjects were: (I) 260,270
to 301,798; (2) 234,613 to 302,220; (4) 211,925 to 276,104; and (5) 236,214
to 290,922.
vania). Two states ( Iowa and Pennsylvania) rejected the call for an
unlimited conv ,1tion twice; two states (?-.lichigan and New York) each
approved and ; 1 jccted a call for such a convention; and Maryland and
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New Hampshire approved two such calls, but Maryland acted on only
one of these. Of the 10 states voting only once on unlimited convention
calls, Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, New Mexico •and Rhode Island were the
only states that registered a favorable vote. The five states that voted
on calls once and rejected them were Louisiana, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma and Utah.
Referenda on limited constitutional convention calls resulted in a higher percentage of approvals than those on unlimited bodies. Of the 10
referenda in five states on the issue, nine were approved in four states;
Kentucky was the only state in which the call was defeated. It is noteworthy that the Rhode Island voters approved three limited constitutional conventions in addition to one unlimited convention.
Convention mandates in the 14 states holding them between 1938 and
1968 ranged from consideration of a single restricted issue, such as
financial assistance for private schools in the Virginia convention ( 1956),
to plenary authority to propose a new constitution. In recent years the
limited convention has grown greatly in popularity. With the notable
exception of the 1947 New Jersey body, the authority of these assemblies
has been limited to stated subjects. The New Jersey convention, which
produced the present state comtitution, was restricted only by the express
prohibition against reapportionment of legislative seats. In some cases
limited conventions have proceeded with a general revision of the constitution. The 1965 Connecticut convention, for example, proposed a new
document, although mandated only to effect legislative apportionment
and to propose appropriate amending procedures.
Considerable difference of opinion exists among legal authorities about
the extent to which a state legislature can limit the power of a convention.18 The prevailing view is that a constitutional convention is bound
by its popular mandate, but not by legislatively imposed limitations on
its proper powers. To avoid legislative limitation of convention authority,
a few state constitutions expressly forbid restriction on their powers. The
Alaska constitution, for example, provides that:
Constitutional conventions shall have plenary power to amend or revise
the constitution, subject only to ratification by the people. No call for a
constitutional convention shall limit these powers of the convention. (Art.
XIII, Sec. 4.)
18
Sec, for example, Ernest R. Bartley, "Methods of Constitutional Change,"
in W. Brooke Craves (ed.), Major Problems in State Constitutional Re1;ision
(Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1960), p. 34; and Sturm, .,tethods of
State Constitutional Reform, pp. 101-103, and the cases there cited.
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PREP ARA TORY RESEARCH

The importance of research as a prerequisite for informed constitutionmaking under modem conditions is evidenced in the emphasis placed on
preparatory studies for recent constitutional conventions. Table 11 indicates that more than half the conventions held since January 1938 were
preceded by preparatory bodies which assembled essential information
for the delegates. Of the unlimited conventions, only the 1964-1969 Rhode
Island body and three of the New Hampshire conventions did not have
the benefit of special advance preparation. Officially designated bodies
and ad hoc groups prepared basic materials for convention delegates in
10 existing states and three territories before conventions assembled.
Chapter 3 deals with major aspects of preparatory commissions. In
addition to these formally designated bodies, ad hoc groups in Puerto
Rico and Tennessee made valuable pre-convention studies without official
sanction; similarly, both before and during the Michigan convention of
1961-1962, the Citizens Research Council of Michigan supplemented the
work of official bodies by preparing useful materials. The nature, method
of designation, composition, work and products of these preparatory
groups have varied widely. The official bodies have usually been appointed by the governor alone or with participation by legislative leaders
or assemblies. As indicated in Chapter 3, the membership of official preparatory bodies ranged upward from three on the Arkansas Constitutional
Convention Advisory Commission to 27 on the Maryland Constitutional
Convention Commission. Members of these commissions were appointive
and ex officio. In most cases preparatory bodies employed a staff, which
varied greatly in size and professional expertise; some commissions, including those in Alaska, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New York and
Pennsylvania, sought the assistance of professors of law, political science
and other disciplines.
Some jurisdictions used existing governmental staff units or outside
professional consulting organizations. The Legislative Research Bureau
of the University of Hawaii, for example, provided research services for
the Hawaii Statehood Commission in 1950, and again assisted the 1968
convention; and the Public Administration Service prepared a series of
studies for the Alaska Statehood Committee. Like other characteristics
of the preparatory organs, their research has varied widely. Typically it
has been of a .ctual, background nature designed to provide information essential f,,. informed basic decision-making and action. In 1968 the
Legislative Reference Bureau of the University of Hawaii prepared a
series of 17 b:.~·kground and comparative studies on particular aspects
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of the constitutional system, citing the experience in other states and
relating the data specifically to the Hawaiian situation. Comparable
studies were prepared by commissions in Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions. In a number of cases, well exemplified by
constitutional commissions in Arkansas and Maryland, preparatory work
included substantive recommendations in the form of a draft constitution.
Although the principal function of these bodies was pre-convention research, some were assigned or assumed other duties. The Michigan and
Maryland preparatory commissions afford excellent examples. The Michigan Constitutional Convention Preparatory Commission, besides supervising the preparation of a series of studies, made arrangements for convention facilities, staff, a library and other essential resources. In ~laryland the Constitutional Convention Commission followed the same general pattern. The staffs of both bodies, like those in a number of other
~tates, were retained and served during the convention.
Legislative funding of pre-convention research and planning ranged
upward to the $800,000 appropriated to the New York preparatory commission during the period 1965-1967. This is by far the largest sum of
money expended to date in preparation for any constitution-making body.
In some instances, exemplified by the ad hoc preparatory work done before the 1953 limited convention in Tennessee, there was little or no
official funding. Variations in financing preparatory work included partial
funding by a statehood commission (Hawaii), a grant from the W. K.
Kellogg Foundation (Michigan), joint funding by a university and the
Carnegie Corporation ( Puerto Rico), payment from the convention's
general fund (Connecticut) and other means.

CONVENTION MEMBERSlllP AND ORGANIZATION

The Delegates
Table 11 indicates that the number of delegates to the 27 constitutional
conventions held from January 1, 1938 through 1968 ranged from 40 in
both the 1945 and 1956 limited conventions in Virginia to a maximum of
481 elected to the 1938 New Hampshire unlimited body. The average
number of delegates for all 27 assemblies was 170. For unlimited bodies
the average was 202, and for limited conventions, 129.
Most delegates were elected from state representative, state senatorial
or congressional districts. Some were elected at large and a few were
ex officio members. The 163 delegates to the 1967-1968 Pennsylvania
convention, for example, included 150 elected from senatorial districts

-72-

(three from each) and 13 ex officio delegates, who were the legislative
officers constituting the preparatory committee. The New Hampshire
delegates were elected by towns and city wards. Of the delegates to the
1950 Hawaii convention, two-thirds were from special districts and the
remaining third were elected at large, as were all delegates to the
Alaska convention. Lower house districts were the representative areas
from which delegates were chosen to the Rhode Island ( 1964-1969),
Maryland (1967-1968) and Hawaii (1968) unlimited conventions. The
186 delegates to the 1967 New York convention included three selected
from each senatorial district and 15 elected at large.
Election of delegates to most conventions has been on a partisan basis.
The nonpartisan selection of delegates to the Maryland and Hawaii bodies
are recent notable exceptions; New Hampshire combined both methods.
Enabling acts in some states have required even division of convention
membership between the two major parties. The 1943-1944 Missouri convention is an earlier example of such a bipartisan body; more recently,
the Connecticut convention and the limited bodies in Rhode Island have
had an equal number of Democrats and Republicans. A common minimum eligibility requirement was that a convention delegate be a qualified elector; in some states he was required to have the same qualifications as a legislator.
Delegates to constitutional conventions in all states were allowed travel
and per diem expenses, except in Rhode Island where the members of
the 1964-1969 convention were reimbursed for travel expenses only. Prior
to 1960 the delegates to few conventions received a stated salary. But since
1960 only in Rhode Island have delegates to unlimited convention~ who
assembled for any extended period of time received no salary payment.
In Michigan delegates received $1,000 per month for seven months; compensation in Connecticut was $2,000 for the four months of the convention; Maryland delegates were paid $2,000 for the four months' duration;
and delegates to the 1968 Hawaii convention received the same compensation as legislators-$2,500 plus per diem ( $32.50 for Oahu delegates,
and $45 for those from other islands) for approximately three and a half
months. New York topped all other states in paying members of the 1967
convention $15,000 for their work, which required less than six months.
Officers of most conventions have not received additional compensation.
Most constitutional conventions have been heavily weighted with representatives of the legal profession. In most recent conventions la•.vyers
comprised f c,m a quarter to half of the membership. Of the 142 delegates
to the 1967-. J68 Maryland convention, for example, 74 were lawyers ( 52.1
percent), L.1 were educators ( 10.6 percent), 19 were small businessmen
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(13.4 percent) and 12 were housewives ( 8.5 percent). There were 11
incumbent legislators and 22 others had served previously in the General
Assembly. Incumbent or former legislators have likewise been prominent
in these constituent bodies. Many businessmen, bankers and industrialists,
also, have been delegates. Academicians were elected relatively infrequently, and labor leaders were only a little more in evidence. Thus, in
Michigan, the center of the automobile industry and with strong labor
organizations, avowed representatives of organized labor comprised only
3 percent of the total membership, reflecting the disproportionate rural
representation in the convention. In contrast, a tenth of the Puerto Rican
convention were labor leaders. Prominent among the delegates of most
conventions have been many distinguished citizens who had served or
were serving in other official capacities-incumbent and former governors, past and present supreme court justices, United States senators,
congressmen, judges, and other state and local officials. Respondents to
the writer's questionnaire predominantly expressed the opinion that the.
quality and competence of convention delegates in their states compared very favorably with the members of their respective legislative
assemblies. Generally, convention delegates had attained a higher level
of education and seemed to be more receptive to politica1 innovation. 19

Officers, Staff and Committees
Officers commonly elected by convention delegates have included a
president or chairman, one or more vice presidents or vice chairmen, and
a secretary. ( The presiding officer of the Connecticut convention was
designated "chairman" and there was one vice chairman. The Rhode Island conventions also used the term "chairman.") Below the top executive level of a typical convention organization are administrative assistants, parliamentarians, assistant secretaries, clerks, sergeants-at-arms and
other lesser functionaries. In constituent assemblies organized on a partisan basis, there may be floor leaders of the major party delegations; these
persons are not formally designated officers of the convention. The Connecticut <:anvention, which was equally divided between Democrats and
Republicans, had two powerful floor leaders, each of whom could prac19
For a demographic and behavioral analysis of the delegates to the Rhode
Island convention, see Cornwell and Goodman, The Politics of the Rhode Island
Constitutional Convention, chap. vii; see also Sturm, Constitution-Making in
Michigan, 1961-1962, chap. iii.
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tically exercise a veto over any proposal brought before the convention. 20
Invariably, the president has been formally elected in plenary sessions
of constitutional conventions. Informal agreement on the person to be
elected, however, has usually been reached before the convention meets.
Convention vice presidencies commonly have been used to secure representation of political groups or factions, geographical areas or divisions,
or to reflect other significant political aspects of constitution-making.
Thus, the 1968 Hawaii convention had five vice presidents, two from
Oahu and one from each of the neighboring islands. The 1961-1962
Michigan convention had three vice presidents, two Republicans and one
Democrat, reflecting roughly the two-to-one partisan ratio in the membership.
All conventions have had their own staffs. Most staff personnel perform administrative, housekeeping or clerical functions; jn addition, practically all conventions involved in extensive revision or the writing of a
new document have had a research component, headed by a director or
co-directors. As the problems confronting conventions have grown more
complex the size of their staffs has increased significantly, especially in the
larger states. Prior to the 1960s, the usual convention staff consisted of 15
to 3.5 people.
Illustrative of the size of staff components in the more recent constitutional conventions with broad mandates are the following: Michigan
(1961-62), average of approximately 75 staff members; Connecticut (196.5),
80; Rhode Island (1964-69), 20; Maryland (1967-68), 105 authorized
positions; Pennsylvania ( 1967-68), (};37 positions; and Hawaii ( 1968), approximately 180 positions, some of which were divided-total 210 persons.
Largest of all ronvention staffs by far was that of the 1967 New York
body. One observer has described the number and compensation of its
staff members as follows:
The 1967 New York State Constitutional Convention can be described
as the best staffed and best financed convention in our history. In addition
to the $2.8 million paid to the delegates, $2.9 million was paid to approximately 900 employees of the convention, including workers in the administrative offices and the secretaries and clerks hired by each delegate. A
great collection of talent, in all pertinent fields, was assembled quickly
to aid the committees and the delegates. And the professional staff was
paid generous salaries. For a six-month period, executive directors received $12 860; counsel for the Democratic side of each committee received $9 90; research associates for the majority received $8,040, and
other pos ... ons were paid on a declining scale. On the Republican side,
See Karl I. Bosworth, "1965 Constitutional Convention: Its Politics and
Issues," Connc.£icut Government, Vol. 19, No. 3 (March, 1966).
20
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the salaries paid did not fi t into a systematic pattern, but the amounts
were equally generous.21
Never had any previous convention recruited a staff of such size that
there were approximately five supporting employees for each delegate.
Overstaffing was one of the administrative problems of the New York
body.
As we have noted, recent conventions have often benefited from research done by preparatory commissions. Permanent governmental agencies also provided valuable research assistance to some conventions. In
addition, recent constitution-making bodies have drawn extensively on the
expertise of professional and academic consultants to augment the efforts
of their regular staff personnel.
Committees comprise anoth er important part of convention organization. Convention committees have been of two general types: first, operational committees that have performed administrative, housekeeping and
procedural functions, with such titles as rules, credentials, agenda, finance
and printing, public information, submiss.ion and address to the people,
and style and drafting; and, second, the substantive committees whose
attention was focused on specific areas of the constitutional system-the
bill of rights, suffrage and elections, the legislature, the executive, the
judiciary, fin ance, local governm ent, amendment and revision, and others.
Usually appoin ted by the pres ident, sometimes with the advice of other
officers, convention committees have varied in number with the ell.i:ent of
constitutional change contemplated. Profiting from the experience of the
1938 New York convention which had more than 30 committees, later
conventions have used a smaller number. The number of operational
committees in conventions since 1950 has ranged from one ( Connecticut,
1965) to ei ght ( New Hampshire, 1964); substantive committees, from
one (Virginia, 1956) to 17 ( Hawaii, 1950). The following tabulation lists
the numbers of both types of committees in seven recent conventions:
Operational

Michigan (1961-62 )
Rhode Island ( 1964-69)
Connecticut ( 1965 )
New York (1967 )
Maryland ( 1967-68 )
Pennsylvania (1967-68)
Hawaii ( 1968)

4

4

1
3
4
4

4

21

Substantive
10
8
2
12
8
-1
10

Richard I. Nunez, "Some Aspects and Problems of Staffing the 1967 ?\'ew
York State Constitutional Convention" ( Prepared fo r delivery at the 1963 :--;a.
tional Conference on Public Administration, Boston, ~larch 27-3cf, 1968), p. 10.
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CONVENTIOSS IN ACTION

Procedure ar,,d Phases of lVork
Constitution-making by convention is lawmaking on the highest level.
Its procedure is similar to that of state lawmaking bodies in many respects, although there are also substantial differences. Some conventions
have adopted the procedural rules of one of the houses of the legislature.
The 1956 Virginia convention, for example, used the Rules of the House
of Delegates and Jefferson's Manual. The procedural manual most frequently adopted by com·entions has been Robert's Rul.es of Order, often
modified by additional rules or used in conjunction with legislative rules.
The 1951-1952 Puerto Rico convention relied on rules largely of its own
drafting. In Michigan the preparatory commission submitted a proposed
set of rules to the convention, which were adopted with some modification.22 Mason's Manual was the authority specified for all cases not covered by these rules. Some conventions in other states have drawn heavily
on the rules of the Michigan body in preparing their own procedural
manuals.
Convention committees commonly held hearings and meetings open
to the public. In the limited Rhode Island conventions, however, all committee meetings were closed. Although most of their meetings were open,
committees in most conventions held some executive ( closed) sessions.
Typically, the required vote for adoption of coinmittee reports and other
proposals was either a majority of the delegates or a majority voting on
the proposal. The 1965 Connecticut body was a major exception, requiring a two-thirds vote ( 56 of the 84 delegates) to adopt all motions and
resolutions.
The work of practically all constitutional conventions usually has proceeded through three phases or· stages: the organizational phase, consisting of seating delegates, adopting rules, electing officers, appointing
committees and attending to other formalities in getting the convention
under way, lasting up to two weeks in the major conventions; the committee stage, in which the substantive committees received proposals,
2 ~ See William J. Pierce, A Prepared Manual of Organization and Procedure
for a State Constitutional Convention, Prepared for the Constitutional Convention Preparatory Commission, September, 1961, pp. 28-107. In designing the
proposals for the 1961-1962 convention, the rules of the Michigan legislature,
those of the 1907-1908 constitutional convention, and the rules of constitutional
conventions in other states were studied carefully; of these, the source relied
upon most was ti1e rules of the ~1ichigan House of Representatives. Sturm,
Constitution-Ma .... ng in Michigan, 1961-1962, pp. 78-79.
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held hearings, made decisions and prepared recommendations for submission to the plenary body; and the final phase of full-scale debate, final
decision-making and action on proposals by the entire convention. Duration of these stages has varied greatly, depending on the nature and
scope of a convention's mandate.

Blocs and Issues
The membership of most recent conventions has seldom divided into
well-defined factions or blocs, but there were a few notable exceptions.
Partisan lines were very evident in the 1967 New York body; and, as
the work of the Michigan convention progressed, voting blocs developed
in the final decision-making phase. The Republican majority in Michigan
split into conservative, middle-of-the-road, and liberal groups; one of the
-discernible voting blocs in the late stages of the convention included
conservative, rural Republicans and urban Democrats. Factional alignments also played a significant role in the course of the very lengthy
proceedings of the unlimited Rhode Island convention. In this body, the
Democratic majority divi~ed into two groups, the legislative faction and
the more independent group. A major objective of the legislator-delegates
was to maintain the existing balance of power between the legislative
and executive branches.
Partisan conflict generally was muted in most conventions. Urban-rural
controversy, however, often exacerbated by m;ilapportioned representation, figured prominently in several conventions; such division occurred
in the 1966 New Jersey assembly, and in the 1950 Hawaii convention in
which there were differences between delegates from Oahu (Honolulu)
and the outlying islands. But factional dissension was usually contained
within party caucuses or by the leadership. The 1967-1968 Maryland
convention, which has been described as predominantly a body of civic
reformers, affords an outstanding example of the nonpartisan approach
to constitution-making. 23 Recent constitutional assemblages, reportedly,
were not significantly affected by personal rivalries, except for occasional
competition for convention offices in the initial stages.
Legislative apportionment has been one of the most troublesome issues
confronting most recent conventions. In fact, it probably ranks first in
importance among the factors responsible for the calling of conventions
:a s~e John P. Wheeler, Jr., and l\lelissa Kinsey, Magnificent Failure: The

1ryland Constitutional Convcnti<m of 1967-1968 (New York, National ~funal'ipal League, 1970), chap. 9.
·'~ 1
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since midcentury. Illustrative of other divisive problems faced by recent
constituent assemblies are the following: in New York (1967), state aid
to parochial schools ; in Pennsylvania ( 1967-1968), tax exemptions, selection of judges and the entire judicial article; in Maryland (1967-1968), the
comptroller's office ( elective or appointive), single-member legislative
districts, and the labor "bill of rights"; and, in Hawaii ( 1968), 18-year-old
voting, judicial selection, legislative salaries, collective bargaining for
public employees and debt limits. Besides the issues pertaining to the
bill of rights, the three branches of government, and suffrage and finance,
other matters that most frequently occupied the attention of most conventions included home rule for cities and counties, other local government issues, constitutional amendment and revision, and excision of essentially statutory matter.

Duration
The 27 constitutional conventions that assembled during the 31-year
period 1938-1968 ran ged in duration from one day to more than 50
months. Rhode Island has the distinction of having held both the shortest
conventions, those of 1944 and 1955 each of which was in session only
one day, and the longest, which convened December 8, 1964, and did not
adjourn sine die until February 17, 1969. The second longest was the Missouri convention which met September 21, 1943, and adjourned September 29, 1944. ( Not included in this calculation are the two "adjourned"
conventions of New Hampshire. The first was in session for 11 days between May 11 and June 1, 1938, and was recalled for a reconvened session September 23-26, 1941; similarly, another convention was in session
from May 15 to June 13, 1956, and met the second time December 2-4,
1959.) Average length of the 27 conventions, including both unlimited
and limited bodies, was 4.4 months; excluding the lengthy Rhode Island
convention, the average is 2.6 months, which is a more realistic .figure.
Averages for unlimited and limited conventions, when computed separately, show substantial differences. The 15 unlimited bodies averaged
approximately seven months in duration, but only four months if the
Rhode Island assembly is excluded; four months is the median in the
durational sequence of the unlimited conventions. As noted above, the
Rhode Island and Missouri assemblies ranked first and second in length,
respectively. i he unlimited conventions of shortest duration were held
in New Ham,;hire, which had two in session for less than one month
each. Duratic ... of the 12 limited bodies was substantially shorter. The
longest, appr,,dmately three months each, were in Pennsylvania ( 1967-
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1968) and New Jersey ( 1947 and 1966); as previously noted,. Rhode
Island held two one-day conventions. The median in the durational sequence of limited conventions was approximately nine days.

PROPOSALS, REFERENDA AND PROMOTION

Convention Products and Voter Action
The 27 constitutional conventions listed in Table 11 proposed 11 new
or revised constitutions and 120 amendments to existing documents. Table
11 lists these proposals and indicates the results of the voters' action on
them. The 15 unlimited bodies produced 10 new or revised constitutions.
T,vo of these were drafted in Hawaii and Alaska and became their
fundamental laws on admission to statehood; a third was prepared for
Puerto Rico's new status as a commonwealth. Four new or revised constitutions were approved by the voters of Connecticut, Ha,vaii, ~lichigan
and Missouri. Thus, Hawaii was the only state to have both a new constitution and an extensive revision of it within the period of this study.H
The 1947 assembly in New Jersey was the only limited convention to
propose a new constitution, and it was approved. Of the ll proposed
new or revised documents, three were rejected in ~laryland ( 1969), New
York ( 1967) and Rhode Island ( 1968).
All amendments proposed by conventions were submitted to the voters
except those in Virginia ( 19-15 and 1956) which were formally proclaimed in effect by the conventions. Of the 118 proposed amendments
submitted to the respective electorates, 94 were adopted. This represented
a rate of voter acceptance of approximately 81 percent, which was far
greater than that accorded proposed amendments submitted by legislatures in the same states during the same period.

Promotional Activity
Delegates to recent constitutional conventions activelv
soucrht
to inform
;
0
the voters of their actions and to mobilize popular support for proposals,
both before and after adjournment. Methods commonlv used involved
all communication media. The Hawaii, Puerto Rico and ~fichigan assemblies and others also regularly issued press releases, and some com·entions created public information committees with mandates to exploit all
24

See Hebden Porteus, "The Constitutional Convention of Hawaii of 1968,"
State Government, XLII, No. 2 (Spring 1969), 97-104.
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media in developing a comprehensive educational program. The com.
mittce on information and submission of the 1968 Hawaii convention
for example, employed a full-time communications specialist for th~
purpose; <laily live educational T\' presentations and weekly taped sum.
maries of convention highlights were other ,najor features of the Hawaii
program. Radio or television or both were extensively employed fn
Alaska, Michigan, Rhode Island a11d some other states. Distribution of
printed drafts of convention proposals and verbatim printing in the pr<'SS
became practically standard practice for the more recent conventions.
Post-adjourn ment efforts to gain support for proposals involved some,
and often m.: 1y, delegates of all recent conventions. Both Republicans
and Democrn campaigned actively for adoption of the five proposals of
the 1967-1968 Pennsylvania body; the president of the convention reported that 161 of the 163 delegates joined the Committee for 5 "Yes•
Votes, of which former Governors George M. Leader and William W.
Scranton served as co-chairmen. More than a hundred delegates to the
Maryland convention carried the burden of the campaign for adoption of
the proposed new document. The Connecticut, Maryland, Hawaii and
other conventions established speakers' bureaus; in Connecticut the delegates formed a series of "task forces" which appeared before citizens'
groups throughout the state.
With few exceptions governors have expressed support for proposals of
conventions. Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller gave "lukewarm" endorsement to the proposed new constitution of New York in 1967, although
most Republican leaders in the convention opposed it. In Michigan,
Democratic Governor John B. Swainson opposed adoption of the new
constitution in 1962, but his Republican successor, George W. Romney,
strongly endorsed and campaigned for it. Former Rhode Island Governor
Dennis J. Roberts, who served as president of the 1964-1969 convention,
opposed its document; Republican Governor John H. Chafce also opposed it.
Generally, legislators have supported most convention proposals, especially those made by the limited conventions over which state lawmaking bodies have exercised substantial initial controls in specifying the
limits of their authority. Illustrative of the exceptions to usual legislative
support was the continued active hostility of some Michigan legislators
in 1962-1963 to the proposed new document. Official opposition to pro·
posed new or revised constitutions has tended generally to come from
local government officers and state elective officials who have feared a
threat to their status in the power structure.
Civic groups that have actively supported state governmental reform
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efforts in the initial stages and worked originally for conventions have
usually been favorable to their proposals. There arc notable exceptions,
however, well exemplified in New York where the League of Women
Voters opposed adoption of the proposed new constitution in 1967, mainly
because of dissatisfaction with the judicial article and some provisions
dealing with education and reapportionment. Organizations and official
groups that previously opposed conventions because they desired to
maintain the status quo have usually extended their opposition to proposals for constitutional change made by these constituent assemblies.

CONVENTION FUNDING
l

State and territorial legislatures appropriated funds for all 27 conventions. Table 11 lists the appropriation figures which, although not precise
for all conventions because exact data were not available to the writer,
arc sufficiently accurate to provide a general index or guide. Except for
five limited conventions ( the three in Tennessee and two in Virginia),
initial funding was for stated sums. The enabling acts in Tennessee merely placed convention delegates on the same pay scale as members of the
legislature; in Virginia the appropriation language specified "a sum sufficient" to· fulfill the needs of the special constituent assemblies. Excluding the expenses of electing delegates to the two Virginia bodies, the
cost of each of these conventions approximated only $10,000 for the
short periods they were in session. Fixed appropriations for all conventions ranged from $25,000 for each of the limited assemblies in Rhode
Island ( 1944, 1951 and 1955) to $10 million for New York's unlimited
convention in 1967.
Legislative funding of the 15 unlimited conventions ranged upward
from $60,000 for New Hampshire in 1948 to the New York high. It is
noteworthy that New York's $10 million appropriation exceeded the total
legislative funding combined for the other 14 unlimited conventions. As
Table 11 indicates, however, only approximately $6.5 million was actually spent for the operation of the New York body. The average appropriation for the 15 unlimited conventions was $1,294,608. If New York is
excluded, the average drops to a more realistic $672,794. Probably an
even closer approximation to the cost of recent unlimited constitutional
assemblies ($910,588) results if the New Hampshire bodies arc also excluded because they proposed more limited constitutional changes, were
in session for shorter periods and had lower appropriatio11s than the
other conventions. The mcdia11 in the sequence of appropriations for un-
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limited conventions arranged in order of their magnitude is the $500,000
appropriation to the 1965 Connecticut body.
Three territories held unlimited constitution-making assemblies during
the 1950s, and th e legislatures provided substantial financial support.
Alaska made the largest initial appropriation, $300,000, but total legislative funding for the 1950 Hawaii convention amounted to $655,000.
Puerto Rico's appropriation of $250,000 was the smallest.
The figures for limited conventions are much lower than those for the
unlimited bodies · because their mandates restricted their activity and
they were in session for shorter periods with resulting lower costs. Legislative appropriations for limited conventions ranged upward from $25,000
for each of the three Rhode Island bodies to $1,560,000 for the 196719&8 Pennsylvania convention. Excluding the three Tennessee assemblies
for which data are not available, average legislative funding for the nine
remaining bodies was $256,234. Because its appropriation was almost four
and a half times that of the next highest (~ew Jersey, 1947 ), inclusion of
the Pennsylvania figure is distorting and produces an atypical result;
excluding it, the resulting average is $93,263.
The appropriation figures listed in Table 11 generally reflect the costs
of holding constitutional conventions at the particular times that they
were convened. Rising costs and inflationary trends, during the last
decade especially, are reflected in the relatively higher figures for the
1960s. A comparison of the two unlimited conventions in Hawaii, each
of which was operative for approximately three and a half months, is
illustrative: Total funding for the 1950 body was $655,000; for the 1968
convention, $1,680,000. Thus, unless adjustments are made, comparison
of the costs of holding constitutional com·entions at different times during a 30-year period presents a distorted result. If appropriate adjustments are made, however, the resulting comparisons can be useful to
planners of future conventions.
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EPILOGUE: DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1969
Three constitutional conventions were officially operative at some time
during 1969 in Arkansas, New Mexico and Illinois. The voters approved
the respective convention calls at referenda held November 5, 1968. Each
of the constituent assemblies had unlimited authority to propose changes;
each was composed of delegates elected on a nonpartisan basis-those
in Arkansas and New Mexico from the same districts as members of the
lower house of the legislature, and those in Illinois from state senatorial
districts. The New Mexico convention was the only one to complete its
work and submit a proposed new constitution to the electorate during
1969. The other two continued into 1970. Table 16 provides general information on the three conventions, each of which is described in further
detail below.

Arkansas' Seventh Convention
The 100 delegates to the Arkansas convention were elected on November 5, 1968, at the same time the voters approved the convention call. A
hvo-day organizational meeting was held January 7-8, 1969. Robert A.
Leflar, former dean of the University of Arkansas Law School and chairman of the study commission, was elected president; four vice presidents
were also elected, one from each congressional district. Ten substantive
and four operational committees and approximately 33 employees assisted
the delegates.
With a total appropriation of $605,200 the convention began its work
on i\lay 27 and was authorized to operate for four months. It recessed on
August 21 after completing second reading of a proposed new constitution. Among the major issues that developed were usury, right to work,
voting age, executive r~organization, independence of the g;ime and fish
and highway commissions, selection of judges and limitations on the taxing power. The convention reconvened on January 12, 1970, and completed its work on February 10. Ninety-eight delegates approved the proposed new constitution, one dissented, and one abstained.
The document, like most such instruments, contained numerous compromises reflecting the efforts of the delegates to accommodate as many
interest groups as feasible. A sample of delegates' opinions indiC;J.tcd a
general consensus that they had produced a practical, conservatin- 111·
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TABLE 16

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
Operative in 1969
Referendum
on Convention
Question

Convention
Dates

Type of
Convention

A, .. msas

January 7-8,
1969; May 27Auiust 21,
19 9 ; January
12-February
10, 1970

Unlimited

November 5, 1968 Constitutional
Vote: 227,429
Revision Study
214,432
Commission
and
Constitutional
Convention
Advisory
Commission

New Mexico

August 5October 20,
1969

Unlimited

November 5, 1968 Constitu tional
Revision
Vote: 80,242
Commission
35,997

lllinoh

Del·ember 8.
1969-

Unlimited

November 5, 1968 Constitution
Vote: 2,979,977
Study
1,135,440
Commission

Statr

I
CX)

u,

Preparatory
Body

I

.

Appropriation
$605,200

$250,000
(plus $280 ,000 for
election of delegates
and referendum on
conven lion proposal)

$2,880.000
(plus SS,000,000 for
election of delegates
and referendum on
.convent ion proposals; total: $7,880,000]

Number of
Convention
Delegates

Convention
Proposal(s/

Referendum
on Com·enriun
Proposal{s)

New
Constitu·
lion

To be referred to
electorate No\'em•
ber 3, 1970

70
New
(Elected
Constitu•
June 17,
tion
1969, from
single mcmbcr repre•
sentative
districts;
nonpartisan)

December 9. 1969
constitution re·
jected
Vote: 59,685
63,387

100
(Elected
Nov. S,
1968 from
representa•
tive districts; nonpartisan)

116
(Elected
Nov. 18,
1969;2
from each
provisional
stata scna•
turial dis•
trict; non•
partisan)

Propusal( s) to be
In
Pre para lion submillcd to the
voters al election
appointed by the
convention not k ,s
than 2 mos. nor
more than 6 mus.
aflcr convc1111un
adjourns

strument that was a great improvement over the present constitution.
Total words in the new document are 16,740, including a 3,169-word
schedule, as contrasted with an estimated 46,000 words in the 1874 constitution. The referendum will be on November 3, 1970. Careful and economical administration of the convention, reflected in the $25 per diem
and $10 per day expense payments to delegates, resulted in an estimated
savings of approximately $125,000 which will be returned to the state
treasury.

The New Mexico Convention
New Mexico's first constitutional convention since statehood was the
second such assembly to convene in 1969. The New Mexico body was supported by an appropriation of $250,000 and was given 60 days to perform
its task. Compensation of delegates was $20 per day and a mileage allowance for one round trip. The 70 delegates, who were elected June 17,
1969, began their work on August 5 at the state capitol in Santa Fe. A
former speaker of the House of Representatives, Bruce King, was elected
president, and he appointed four vice presidents. General administrative
framework of the convention included nine substantive and four operational committees and a staff of approximately 65 secretarial, clerical and
custodial personnel. Principal issues that developed focused mainly on
the short ballot, executive reorganization, judicial selection, local home
rule and public support for parochial education. After 64 days of arduous
labor, the delegates approved a proposed new constitution and adjourned
sine die on October 20.
Among the significant changes proposed were: annual legislative sessions without limit, reapportionment of the legislature every 10 years,
executive reorganization subject to legislative veto, increased gubernatorial powers of law enforcement, a shorter ballot, integration of executive agencies into 20 departments, a limit of two successive four-year
terms for elective officers, reduction of the voting age to 20 and permissive legislative authority to relax requirements for voting in presidential elections, limited local home rule, reorganization of the state board of
education, legislative authority to provide for local initiation of ordinances, and a liberalized amendment and revision procedure. The most
significant changes were in the legislative and executive branches and
local government. The proposed document contained an estimated 15,000
words, approximately 9,000 shorter than the present constitution.
Less than two months intervened between sine die adjournment of
the convention and the referendum on the constitution, which was submitted as a single proposition on December 9. Convention delegates bore
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the major campaign burden in supp0rt of the document, which was endorsed by most statewide organizations. Major opponents included legislators, public employees and some conservation groups. The voters rejected the proposed constitution by a vote of 59,685 to 6.3,337-a margin
of only 3,702 in a total vote of 123,072. The urban areas gave the document the greatest support; it lost heavily in the state's Spanish-speaking
areas.

Illinois' Sixth Constituent Assembly
Almost 100 years to the day after the constitutional convention that
drafted Illinois' present constitution met, the state's sixth constituent assembly convened on December 8, 1969, in the chamber of the House of
Representatives in Springfield. 8 The constitutional convention enabling
act, approved by Governor Richard B. Ogilvie on May 7, 1969, pro\ided
for 116 delegates, two elected on a nonpartisan basis from each senatorial
district at a special election on November 18. To choose nominees in
those districts where five or more persons filed petitions for nomination,
the act provided for a primary election on September 23. Besides provision for nomination and election of delegates, the enabling legislation
appropriated $2.88 million to defray convention expenses. Designated
rate of compensation for delegates was $625 per month for a period not
to exceed eight months, plus $75 per diem for a maximum of 100 days, in
addition to mileage, a postage allotment and e:-..-penses; the act specified
appropriate adjustments for officeholder delegates and convention officers.
The delegates elected Samuel \V. Witwer, a Chicago attorney and
former Republican candidate for the U. S. Senate ( 1960), president of the
convention; also named were three vice presidents and a secretary. Additional organizational components for accomplishing the mission of the
convention were nine substantive and three procedural committees. The
tentative schedule for convention procedure is as follows: Februarycommittee hearings; March-preparation of committee proposals and
supporting reports; April and May-first reading of committee proposals
in committee of th e whole; June-convention debates on second reading;
July-final convention action on third reading, detennination of the method of submission, and approval of the "Address to the People" ( constitution submission) .9 Although there is no time limit on the convention, the
8

The present constitution of Illinois, ratified July 2, 1870, was the product
of the state's fourth constitutional convention which met from December 13,
1369 to .May 13, 1870.
• Tli,.: Weekly Illinois Constitutional Convention Summary, No. 4, week end-

'°~ ft'bruary 7, 1970, p.

I.

-87-

delegates' pay will terminate alter eight months ( or on August 8, 1970) .
The enabling act directed the convention to submit its proposal( s) to
·the vote~ not less than two nor more than six months after adjournment.
On April 14 the convention adopted the recommendation of its Rules
Committee "that revisions, alterations or amendments to the constitution
proposed by the convention be submitted to the voters at an election to
take place after the November 3 general election.'' 10 In an earlier action
the convention had agreed that the special election for ratification be set
not less than 27 days before, nor 27 days following, the general election.
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